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RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Bankruptcy-Rule 1 1-44-Non-bankruptcy Appeal Not Stayed Upon
Institution of Bankruptcy Proceeding Where Property at Issue Is in
Custody of The Court And No Longer Property of Debtor.Defendants, Fidelity-Mortgage Investors (FMI), executed a promissory note
payable to plaintiff, Mid-Jersey National Bank (Mid-Jersey). When FMI
failed to make payment on the date of maturity, Mid-Jersey commenced
action in the Superior Court of New Jersey, claiming damages in the amount
of $240,000 plus interest. The suit was removed to federal district court,
which granted summary judgment in favor of Mid-Jersey, but ordered a stay
on execution of the judgment pending appeal on the condition that FMI file a
supersedeas bond. Subsequently, the court modified its order and permitted
FMI to place a negotiable certificate of deposit in court in lieu of the
supersedeas bond. While the appeal was pending FMI filed a petition for
reorganization under Chapter XI of the Bankruptcy Act. Before turning to
issues pertaining to the summary judgment and pre- and post-judgment
interest on that judgment,' the Third Circuit held that the institution of
chapter XI proceedings did not stay the proceedings under appeal. MidJersey National Bank v. Fidelity-Mortgage Investors, 518 F.2d 640 (3d Cir.
1975).
In determining that it could continue its exercise of jurisdiction over the
matters on appeal, the court analyzed in detail Bankruptcy Rule 11-44, which
provides in pertinent part:
A petition filed under Rule 11-6 or 11-7 shall operate as a stay of the commencement
or the continuation of any court or other proceeding against the debtor, or the
enforcement of any judgment against him, or of any act or the commencement or
continuation of any court proceeding to enforce any lien against his property ....2
The court concluded that the property which was deposited by FAII in court
was no longer "property of the debtor" and, therefore, not subject to the
exclusive jurisdiction of a chapter XI court.
Before rule 11-44 was promulgated by the Supreme Court, 3 a stay of
non-bankruptcy proceedings was not considered the right of the debtor, but
rather was considered within the court's discretion. 4 Rule 11-44 in effect
1. These issues presented no substantial problem to the court of appeals and are not
considered here.
2. Bankruptcy Rule 11-44(a).
3. See Bankruptcy Rules and Official Bankruptcy Forms, 415 U.S. 1003, 1033 (effective July
1, 1974), promulgated pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2075 (1970), which provides in part: "The
Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe by general rules, the forms of process, writs,
pleadings, and motions, and the practice and procedure under the Bankruptcy Act. Such rules
shall not abridge, enlarge, or modify any substantive right." See S. Rep. No. 1561, 88th Cong.,
2d Sess. (1964).
4. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy
3.20[3], at 234-35 (14th ed. 1975).
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provides for an automatic stay of such proceedings. 5 It was intended to
supplement and reinforce bankruptcy policy as contained in three sections of
the Act. 6 Section 2(a), which grants bankruptcy courts various jurisdictional
powers, 7 had little relevance to the issue in Mid-Jersey. Section 314, which
grants bankruptcy courts the discretionary power to enjoin or stay proceedings instituted to enforce liens upon the property of the debtor, 8 has been
interpreted generally as preventing creditors or other parties from interfering
with the chapter XI proceeding by the commencement of suits against the
debtor or his property in other jurisdictions. 9 Section 311,10 the interpretation
of which was critical to the court's holding, is relevant principally because the
jurisdictional grant contained in it necessarily encompasses the granting of
stays and injunctions of non-bankruptcy proceedings."1
Section 311 provides:
Where not inconsistent with the provisions of this chapter, the court in which the
have exclusive jurisdiction of the
petition is filed shall, for the purposes of this chapter,
12
debtor and his property, wherever located.
This section has been interpreted to confer upon chapter XI courts exclusive summary jurisdiction1 3 to determine controversies with respect to property owned by the debtor 14 or property which is deemed to be in the
5. See id. 3.20, at 234-37. The Advisory Committee's Note appended to rule 11-44 does not
expressly state that the filing of a petition will result in an automatic stay. However, in discussing
the applicability of the stay to a pending arbitration the note states: "The reference to a stay...
is to signify the inclusion of a pending arbitration proceeding within the scope of the automatic
stay." Bankruptcy Rule 11-44, Advisory Committee Note.
6. Bankruptcy Rule 11-44, Advisory Committee Note.
7. Bankruptcy Act § 2(a), 11 U.S.C. § 11(a) (1970).
8. Id. § 314, 11 U.S.C. § 714 (1970).
9. See Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Krull, 21
F. Supp. 377 (M.D. Pa. 1937), rev'd on other grounds sub nom. Kieda v. Kruli, 101 F.2d 917 (3d
Cir. 1939) (jurisdictional grounds).
10. Bankruptcy Act § 311, 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970).
11. Bankruptcy Rule 11-44, Advisory Committee Note.
12. Bankruptcy Act § 311, 11 U.S.C. § 711 (1970).
13. A chapter XI court also has plenary jurisdiction, but such jurisdiction is limited by
section 23(b) of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 46(b) (1970), which is made applicable to
chapter XI by section 302, 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1970). Section 23(b) basically limits the plenary
jurisdiction of all bankruptcy courts to suits brought pursuant to other specified sections of the
3.01[2] n.5, [4] n. 11, 6.32[6] (14th ed. 1975). The distinction
Act. See 8 Collier on Bankruptcy
between a plenary suit and a summary proceeding is basically procedural. A plenary suit
requires, among other things, formal pleadings and summons, which are not required in a
summary proceeding. Central Republic Bank & Trust Co. v. Caldwell, 58 F.2d 721, 731-32 (8th
Cir. 1932). The differences between a plenary suit and a summary proceeding are now minimal,
because the formality applicable to plenary suits is now required in summary proceedings; the
only substantial difference between the two is that a plenary suit may be tried by either the court
or a jury, while a summary proceeding is limited to trial by the court. See 8 Collier on
Bankruptcy
3.01[3], at 149-50 (14th ed. 1975).
14. Section 311 jurisdiction over property owned by the debtor must be distinguished from
the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts under chapters I-VII, Bankruptcy Act §§ 2, 23, 11 U.S.C.
§§ 11, 46 (1970). This latter jurisdiction is limited to property in the possession of the debtor. See
3.02, at 156-58 (14th ed. 1975).
8 Collier on Bankruptcy
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whether actual or constructive, 1 6 of the debtor or the bankpossession,
17
ruptcy court. Thus, two criteria exist for establishing jurisdiction of a
chapter XI court-property of the debtor and possession by the debtor or
trustee.
In applying the "property of the debtor" test, federal courts have consistently looked to ownership, holding that where a debtor has no property
interest in the assets at issue, a chapter XI court has no jurisdiction under
15

section 311.18

Chapter XI jurisdiction also may attach to property in the proper
possession-actual or constructive-of the debtor or the bankruptcy trustee. 19
Under this test, the principal difficulty is in determining the presence of
constructive possession. Constructive possession by the debtor has been found
in situations where property was held in escrow by a third party in the name
of the bankrupt 2° and where real property of the debtor owner was subject to
a lease by a third party. 21 In Taubel-Scott-Kitzmiller Co. v. Fox,2 2 the
Supreme Court found constructive possession to exist:
where the property was in the physical possession of the debtor at the time of the filing
of the petition in bankruptcy, but was not delivered by him to the trustee; where the
property was delivered to the trustee, but was thereafter wrongfully withdrawn from
his custody; where the property is in the hands of the bankrupt's agent or bailee; where
the property is held by some other person who makes no claim to it; and where the
property is held by one who makes a claim, but the claim is colorable only.2
15. Pasadena Inv. Co. v. Weaver, 376 F.2d 175, 178 (9th Cir. 1967); Slenderella Sys., Inc. v.
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 286 F.2d 488, 490 (2d Cir. 1961); Ric-Wil, Inc. v. First Pa. Banking &
Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 782, 786 (E.D. Pa. 1973). See generally 1 Collier on Bankruptcy S 2.06,
at 155-57 (14th ed. 1974).
Summary jurisdiction over property in the proper possession of the debtor or trustee is derived
from Bankruptcy Act §§ 2, 23, 11 U.S.C. §§ 11, 46 (1970) and is made applicable to Chapter XI
by id. § 302, 11 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
16. Bayview Estates, Inc. v. Bayview Estates Mobile Homeowners Ass'n, SOS F.2d 405, 407
(6th Cir. 1974); Pasadena Inv. Co. v. Weaver, 376 F.2d 175, 177 (9th Cir. 1967); Rawlings v.
United States, 388 F. Supp. 47, 50 (D. Idaho 1975).
17. Loyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc., 327 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1964). In Loyd, the court
reasoned that section 311 confers jurisdiction upon the chapter XI court over both property
owned by the debtor and property in the possession of the debtor or trustee. Id. But see note 14
supra.
18. In re Texas Consumer Fin. Corp., 480 F.2d 1261, 1266 (5th Cir. 1973); In re JournalNews Corp., 193 F.2d 492 (2d Cir. 1951) (held, because a debtor corporation possessed no
property interest in the shares of its stockholders, the chapter XI court had no jurisdiction to
restrain shareholders from disposing of their stock); United States v. Neiwirth, 370 F. Supp. 929,
934 (D.N.J. 1974).
19. See notes 15-17 supra and accompanying text.
20. Ric-Wil, Inc. v. First Pa. Banking & Trust Co., 352 F. Supp. 782, 787 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
21. Pasadena Inv. Co. v. Weaver, 376 F.2d 175, 178 (9th Cir. 1967) (owner held constructively possessed of a reversionary interest in the property).
22. 264 U.S. 426 (1924).
23. Id. at 432-33 (footnotes omitted); see Harrison v. Chamberlin, 271 U.S. 191, 195 (1926)
(definition of substantial adverse claim); In re Barasch, 439 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1971)

(same).
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On the other hand, one court has held that books of a debtor in the
possession of a warehouse were not subject to the summary jurisdiction of a
bankruptcy court, since the debtor could not take actual possession of the
books without the permission of a certain bank.2 4 Another decision required
that property in the hands of a third party be acknowledged by the third party
to be unconditionally
subject to the debtor's demand before summary jurisdic25
tion would attach.
Summary jurisdiction of the bankruptcy courts consistently has been denied
where property is not within the actual or constructive possession of the
debtor or bankruptcy court and a substantial claim, as opposed to a merely
colorable one, has been asserted by an adverse party. 26 In Phelps v. United
States, 27 the Supreme Court found summary jurisdiction to be lacking. Where
certain assets had been transferred to the assignee by the bankrupt taxpayer,
they were not subject to claims of either the bankrupt or his receiver since the
assignee held
the assets as custodian of the United States, a bona fide adverse
28
claimant.
Until Mid-Jersey, no court had decided the question of whether a chapter
XI court has exclusive jurisdiction over monies required to be deposited in
court pending appeal 29 by a debtor, where such monies were deposited prior
to the debtor's filing of a chapter XI petition. However, courts dealing with a
variety of analogous issues, including related questions regarding the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, have analyzed the nature and status of funds
required to be deposited in court.
3
30
Two such cases, United States v. Klein and In re Moneys Deposited, 1
involved attempts by the state of Pennsylvania to escheat unclaimed funds
24. In re American S. Publishing Co., 426 F.2d 160, 164 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 903
(1970).
25. Buss v. Long Island Storage Warehouse Co., 64 F.2d 338 (2d Cir. 1933). The property in
question, held by a warehouse as unclaimed freight, was subject to the demand of either buyer or
seller. Id. at 339. See Bayview Estates, Inc. v. Bayview Estates Mobile Homeowners Ass'n, 508
F.2d 405, 408 (6th Cir. 1974); 2 Collier on Bankruptcy 1 23.06, at 506.2-06.3 (14th ed. 1975). In
substance, Collier states that summary jurisdiction will attach over property of the bankrupt In
the possession of a third party only where the third party makes no adverse claim to the property
and the bankrupt retains unconditional control over the property.
26. E.g., In re Barasch, 439 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1971); Loyd v. Stewart & Nuss, Inc.,
327 F.2d 642, 645 (9th Cir. 1964); United States v. Neiwirth, 370 F. Supp. 929, 934 (D.N.J.
1974).
27. 421 U.S. 330 (1975).
28. Id. at 337.
29. FMI had not filed a supersedeas bond but merely made a deposit in court. After a
supersedeas bond has been filed, the surety remains liable on the obligation even when the
principal later files a petition in bankruptcy during the pendency of the appeal. See In re Quaker
City Cold Storage Co., 45 F. Supp. 570 (E.D. Pa. 1942), aff'd sub nom. Quaker Cold Storage Co.
v. Kendall, 138 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1943) (purpose of supersedeas bond is protection in the event of
bankruptcy). It appears, then, that for the purposes of the court's analysis in Mid-Jersey there Is
no significant difference between the supersedeas bond and the certificate of deposit.
30. 303 U.S. 276 (1938).
31. 243 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1957).
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deposited in federal courts for the benefit of rightful claimants who could not
be located at the time of the original judgments.
The background facts in Klein were those that formed the basis of a
judgment in an earlier action. In that previous action defendant, who had
been found liable for wrongful appropriation of securities, was required to
pay into the federal district court's registry sums owed to bondholders who
could not be located. 32 After five years all unclaimed monies were deposited
in the United States Treasury. When Pennsylvania petitioned in state court to
escheat the funds, the United States argued that the state court had no
jurisdiction to escheat funds in the custody of the United States courts. The
United States Supreme Court held that the decree of the state court granting
escheat was not an unconstitutional interference with the federal courts nor an
invasion of United States sovereignty. 33 The Court determined that the
federal court in which the funds were deposited had acquired exclusive
jurisdiction over the deposited funds, but only to the extent necessary to
exercise appropriate control and disposition of the property. 3'
Similarly, in In re Moneys Deposited, the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit determined that with respect to funds deposited in federal court
during a bankruptcy proceeding, the court serves as "statutory trustee for the
'3S
rightful owners when and if they are determined by the court.
36
In neither case had the Government made a claim of title to the funds,
even though the monies had been deposited in the name and to the credit of
the court. 37 Such a claim would have been fruitless in any event, since both
decisions appeared to recognize the existence of a rightful owner at all times.
In Klein the Court stated "that the fund remains subject to the order of the
district court to be paid to the persons lawfully entitled to it upon proof of
their ownership." 38 Accepting this interpretation, the court in In re Moneys
Deposited concluded that the United States held the funds for the "rightful
39
owners."
While the government-and perforce, the federal courts--has no claim to
the deposited funds, neither does the person who made the deposit. In Hansen
32.
33.
34.

303 U.S. at 277.
Id. at 280-82.
Id. at 281.

35.

243 F.2d at 445.

36. 303 U.S. at 280; 243 F.2d at 447.
37. 303 U.S. at 282; 243 F.2d at 447. In the earlier action on which In re Moneys Deposited
was based, the deposit had been made pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2041 (1970) which provided: "All
moneys paid into any court of the United States, or received by the officers thereof, in any case
pending or adjudicated in such court, shall be forthwith deposited with the Treasurer of the
United States or a designated depositary, in the name and to the credit of such court. This section
shall not prevent the delivery of any such money to the rightful owners upon security, according
to agreement of parties, under the direction of the court."
In Klein the monies had been deposited pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2041 (1970). Having remained
on deposit for more than five years the monies were transferred to the United States Treasury
pursuant to id. § 2042 (1970).
38. 303 U.S. at 280.
39. 243 F.2d at 445.

842
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v. United States40 a landlord who had paid a judgment for rent overcharges
brought a motion to reopen the judgment so that unclaimed funds might be
returned. The funds had already been transferred to a trust receipt account

with the United States Treasury4 1 pursuant to statute. 4 2 In denying the

landlord's motion the court observed that he had "no title or right to any
money he paid to satisfy the judgment," and that the United States " 'holds
the money as statutory trustee for the rightful owners when and if they are
determined by the court.' -43
Dealing with a more complicated fact situation, the court in Saper v.
West 44 appeared to reach the same conclusion. In Saper, the trustee of a
bankrupt corporation sought to recover funds distributed by the court to
judgment creditors pursuant to an earlier judgment. Under the earlier judgment, the corporation had deposited funds with the federal district court;

within four months of the distribution of the funds 45 by the court the
corporation filed a voluntary petition in bankruptcy. Ii affirming on the

merits the district court's dismissal of the trustee's action, the second circuit

reasoned that the bankrupt's interest in the distributed funds was highly
remote. It was, the court noted, contingent upon the unlikely possibility that
the judgment of the district court in the earlier action would be reversed on
appeal. 4 6 Moreover, the court observed that under the applicable law "no
creditor could have obtained a lien on the fund 'in custodia legis.' 147

In Mid-Jersey National Bank v. Fidelity-Mortgage Investors48 the court

held that rule 11-44 is "exclusively procedural" and should not alter any
substantive right conferred by section 311. The funds required to be deposited
with the clerk of the court pending appeal no longer constituted the property
40. 340 F.2d 142 (8th Cir. 1965).
41. Id. at 143.
42. 31 U.S.C. § 725p (1970) (creation of a trust fund for, inter alia, unclaimed portions of
judgment monies deposited in court by judgment debtors). "Defendant has no title or right to any
money he paid to satisfy the judgment. A judgment debtor who has paid his judgment is not the
rightful owner of unclaimed portions of the judgment deposited in a trust account in the Treasury
pursuant to the statute." 340 F.2d at 143.
43. 340 F.2d at 143-44, quoting In re Moneys Deposited, 243 F.2d 443, 445 (3d Cir. 1957).
44. 263 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 916 (1959).
45. The trustee in bankruptcy may recover the proceeds of any preferential transfer made
within four months of the filing. Bankruptcy Act § 60, 11 U.S.C. § 96 (1970).
46. 263 F.2d at 427.
47. Id., citing Dunsmoor v. Furstenfeldt, 88 Cal. 522, 26 P. 518 (1891); Credit Bureau, Inc.
v. Getty, 61 Cal. App. 2d 823, 142 P.2d 105 (1943).
The court also determined that because the transfer.of funds was made not by the debtor but
by the court, the transfer was not fraudulent under the Bankruptcy Act. 263 F.2d at 428. See
Bankruptcy Act § 67d(2)(a), 11 U.S.C. § 107(d)(2)(a) (1970) (transfer is fraudulent if made by the
debtor without fair consideration within one year of filing. Similarly, the court rejected the
argument that the transfer constituted a preference under section 60b of the Act. 263 F.2d at 428.
See 11 U.S.C. § 96(b) (1970) (preference voided where given to a creditor who had knowledge or
reason to know that the debtor was insolvent).
48.

518 F.2d 640 (3d Cir. 1975).
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of the depositor within the meaning
of the section. Therefore, no automatic
49
stay of the appeals could issue.
The court determined that the purpose of a stay under bankruptcy law is
twofold: to prevent interference with the debtor's property during the bankruptcy proceedings, 5 0 and to prevent creditors from instituting lawsuits in
other jurisdictions for the purpose of defeating the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.5 1 The court stated that a stay could be issued only when it
advanced the primary purpose of a chapter XI proceeding. " '[S]tays must be
ancillary to the main purpose of the [chapter XI] proceeding and are not
lawful when they cannot contribute to execution of the plan.' "52 In applying
the test, the court observed:
In this respect § 311 of the Bankruptcy Act, 11 U.S.C. § 711, is crucial to our analysis.
..
[Tihe automatic stay of subsection (a) of Rule 11-44 extends only to proceedings
which could divest the debtor of property over which the Chapter XI court has
jurisdiction.
The question we must resolve, therefore, is whether the certificate deposited in the
district court is the property of the debtor over which the Chapter XI court has
53
exclusive jurisdiction.

In determining that the deposit by FMI could be considered "the res of a
trust, 5 4 the court relied upon In re Moneys Deposited,SS Baxter v. United
7
Forest Products Co., 56 and Saper v. West.5
49. Id. at 643-44.
50. Id., citing Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re
Krull, 21 F. Supp. 377 (M.D. Pa. 1937), rev'd sub nom. Kieda v. Krull, 101 F.2d 917 (3d Cir.
1939). In Teledyne, the court held that the order of the bankruptcy court to stay all actions
against Eon did not preclude Teledyne from obtaining an order requiring Eon to produce certain
documents requested by Teledyne: "So long as the purpose served by the stay, the preservation of
Eon's property from adverse judgment, is observed in these proceedings, I see no obstacle to
requiring this limited participation of Eon here." 373 F. Supp. at 203.
51. 518 F.2d at 643, citing First Nat'l Bank v. Lake, 199 F.2d 524 (4th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 344 U.S. 914 (1953); Teledyne Indus., Inc. v. Eon Corp., 373 F. Supp. 191, 203
(S.D.N.Y. 1974); In re Bargain City, U.S.A., Inc., 212 F. Supp. 111 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
52. 518 F.2d at 643, quoting In re Commonwealth Bond Corp., 77 F.2d 308, 309-10 (2d Cir.
1935) (L. Hand, J.). In Commonwealth the court held that a stay of a court proceeding could not
issue where the proceeding did not "touch the debtor's property." Id. at 309. The court reasoned
that since jurisdiction over the subject matter of the stay was lacking, no stay could properly
issue. Id. It is precisely this logic which the Mid-Jersey court adopted in refusing to grant a stay
under rule 11-44.
53. 518 F.2d at 643. The court did not analyze the second independent criterion for finding
Chapter XI jurisdiction: property in the actual or constructive possession of the debtor or trustee.
The monies deposited in the Mld-Jersey case, however, were clearly not subject to the unconditional control of FMI; neither could it be said that the court was holding the funds for the benefit
of FMI. See text accompanying notes 13-28 supra.
54. 518 F.2d at 643.
55. 243 F.2d 443 (3d Cir. 1957).
56. 406 F.2d 1120 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1018 (1969).
57. 263 F.2d 422 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 360 U.S. 916 (1959).
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The Mid-Jersey court employed Baxter as support for the proposition that
the depositor retained "no recognizable interest remaining in the funds after
the deposit was made, and that the court was holding the moneys in trust for
the rightful owners .... "58 In Baxter, plaintiff purchaser, United Forest
Products Co., alleged fraud and misrepresentation by defendant seller in a
contract for sale of a lumber company. Though plaintiff affirmed the contract,
claiming that a forfeiture clause made recission impractical, it sought to
sequester funds which it deposited with the district court as installment
payments of the contract price.5 9 The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
stated: "Plaintiff has no recognizable interest remaining in those funds. Mere
allegations of tortious injury cannot give plaintiff any specific interest in
defendants' property. ' 60 The court reasoned that defendants owned the funds
by virtue of the contract, and the fact that the monies were paid into the
61
district court's registry did not alter the reality of that ownership.
The court in Mid-Jersey noted that its factual situation corresponded with
that in Saper, in that both cases involved funds required to be deposited in
court, and in addition, both parties, in attempting to assert an interest in the
funds, had filed petitions in bankruptcy. 62 The court reasoned that FMI's
interest in the funds was too remote since, just as in Saper, FMI's only
63
remaining interest in the deposited moneys was a contingent one:
Once the deposit had been effected, "there was no possible way in which [the
bankrupt] could transfer these funds to a third party... until or unless that judgment
were reversed. ....
"
• . . [Tihe only property interest FMI has had in the certificate is a contingent
reversionary interest as a potential beneficiary of the trust. 64
The court in Mid-Jersey would appear to be in accord with the rationale
that property is "property of the debtor" within the scope of section 311 where
the debtor possesses the power to make some form of transfer or assignment
of the property. 65 FMI had no such power, and so the funds were no longer
58.

518 F.2d at 644.

59.

It paid the installments to avoid forfeiture under the contract. 406 F.2d at 1125.

60. Id.
61. Id.
62.

518 F.2d at 644.

63.

Id. The factual situation in the Saper case was somewhat more sharply drawn. There the

funds were ordered to be paid to the defendant after plaintiffs motion for a new trial was denied,

after plaintiff had lost on appeal, and after plaintiff's petition for a rehearing was denied.
Furthermore, plaintiff did not file for a voluntary petition in bankruptcy until almost four months

after the sums were ordered by the court to be paid to the defendants and shortly before the
statutory deadline. See note 45 supra and accompanying text. The court in Saper stated that the
filing of the bankruptcy petition could easily be construed as a "devious maneuver" by the
bankrupt's officer. 263 F.2d at 426.
64. 518 F.2d at 644, quoting in part Saper v. West, 263 F.2d 422, 427 (2d Cir. 1957), cert.
denied, 360 U.S. 916 (1959).
65. See In re United Milk Prods. Co., 261 F. Supp. 766 (N.D. Ill.
1966), where the court
stated, "[t]he test which is to be applied [in determining whether certain assets are property of the
debtor such that title would vest in the trustee in bankruptcy pursuant to Bankruptcy Act
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its property within the meaning of the section. A mere reversionary interest
subject to the obtaining of a reversal on appeal was deemed not to be
sufficient; the court suggested that only when the interest of the debtor was
6
represented by a "rightful claim" will Chapter XI jurisdiction attach. "
John C. Eagan

Civil Procedure-Second Circuit Examines Appealability of Remittitur.-Plaintiff brought an action against his employer for job-related injuries. After a trial resulted in a jury verdict of.$75,000, the district court
found the verdict "grossly excessive" and ordered a new trial when the
plaintiff refused to remit $30,000 of his award. In a memorandum supporting
a motion for reargument, the plaintiff indicated a willingness to submit to the
remittitur under protest and appeal directly from the reduced judgment. In
denying the motion, the court did not mention the alternative suggestion
made by the plaintiff. I At the second trial, the plaintiff was awarded $16,000
in damages; his motion for a new trial on the ground that the verdict was
inadequate was denied. 2 On appeal from the verdict of the second trial, the
plaintiff claimed that he should either be allowed to appeal on the basis he
proposed or that he should receive the $45,000 remitted award. 3 In rejecting
both of the plaintiffs claims, 4 the court conceded that the problem of
§ 70a(5), (c), 11 U.S.C. § l10(a)(5), (c) (1970)] turns on whether at the time the petition was filed,
under applicable state law, the property involved could have been 'transferred by the debtor or
levied upon and sold under judicial process against' it, or otherwise could have been 'seized,
impounded or sequestered.'" Id. at 768, quoting Young v. Handwork, 179 F.2d 70 (7th Cir.
1949), cert. denied, 339 U.S. 949 (1950).
66. 518 F.2d at 644.
1. Upon denial of the motion for reargument, the plaintiff sought a writ of mandamus from
the Second Circuit directing the district court to enter judgment in the manner requested by the
plaintiff. The petition was denied, Reinertsen v. Mansfield, No. 71-1589 (June 22, 1971), and the
second trial was held. Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Constr. Corp., 519 F.2d 531, 533 (2d Cir.
1975).
2. Id. at 532. A jury verdict will not be reversed as inadequate unless the court finds the
award to be grossly and palpably inadequate. Caskey v. Village of Wayland, 375 F.2d 1004, 1007
(2d Cir. 1967).
3. 519 F.2d at 533.
4. '[W]e see no persuasive reason why he could not have accepted the remittitur and then
filed a notice of appeal, relying on the record he had already made to establish that his acceptance
was 'under protest.' Instead, plaintiff sought the issuance of mandamus, a remedy granted by
this court only under exceptional circumstances. Having failed to appeal from the earlier order
and having had a new trial at which he might have obtained a verdict higher than the amount to
which Judge Mansfield required a remittitur, plaintiff cannot now be allowed to treat Judge
Mansfield's order, augmented by plaintiff's proffered acceptance under protest and waiver of a
new trial, as a final judgment. This is particularly so since the time for appealing from such a
judgment had long since expired when the instant notice of appeal was filed." Id. at 536 (footnote omitted).
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appealability of remittitur was "interesting,"' 5 but refused to state unequivocally whether it would liberalize its views. Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers
Construction Corp., 519 F.2d 531 (2d Cir. 1975).
Where a jury awards a successful plaintiff an excessive verdict, the trial
court may properly order a new trial 6 and submit the case to another jury for
deliberation. 7 However, new trials are costly and time-consuming. For these
reasons, the courts devised the practice of granting a new trial where the
verdict was excessive unless the plaintiff agreed to a remittitur. 8 It has been
the general rule in the federal sphere for more than seventy years that
acceptance of the remittitur by the plaintiff precludes review by an appellate
court. 9 In recent years, however, the traditional rule has been questioned by
several courts' ° and rejected by at least one circuit. 1 In another circuit,
entirely different considerations have precluded an application of the tradi12
tional rule.
5. Id.
6. Wood v. Gunston, 82 Eng. Rep. 864 (K.B. 1655).
7. The second trial may be limited to the issue of damages alone. See Gasoline Prods. Co. v.
Champlin Co., 283 U.S. 494, 500 (1931).
8. F. James, Civil Procedure § 7.21, at 323 (1965). In Dimick v. Schiedt, 293 U.S. 474 (1935),
the Court held that remittitur did not violate the seventh amendment's prohibition against
re-examination of jury-found fact by the court. The practice was upheld as a practical method of
correcting a jury verdict which has the effect of "merely lopping off an excrescence." Id. at 486.
The court may not order a remittitur without giving the successful plaintiff an opportunity to
accept or face a new trial. Prochot v. Drew, 283 F.2d 904 (7th Cir. 1960).
9. Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79, 81-82 (1917); Gila Valley, G. & N. Ry. v. Hall,
232 U.S. 94, 104-05 (1914); Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., 158 U.S. 41, 52
(1895); Lewis v. Wilson, 151 U.S. 551, 555 (1894); Kennon v. Gilmer, 131 U.S. 22, 30 (1889); S.
Birch & Sons v. Martin, 244 F.2d 556, 562 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 837 (1957); Mattox
v. News Syndicate Co., 176 F.2d 897, 904 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949). For the
states' views on the subject, see generally Annot., 16 A.L.R.3d 1327 (1967); for the Wisconsin
view, which allows the plaintiff a review of the order of remittitur if his opponent appeals, see
Plesko v. City of Milwaukee, 19 Wis. 2d 210, 220-21, 120 N.W.2d 130, 134-35 (1963).
10. See, e.g., Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964); Thomas v.
E.J. Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163, 1171 (E.D. Pa. 1971), rev'd on other grounds, 476 F.2d
471 (3d Cir. 1973).
11. The Fifth Circuit has instituted a circuit-wide rule which allows such appeals if the
remittitur is accepted under protest and the reduced judgment is not collected. See notes 18-30
infra and accompanying text.
12. The Sixth Circuit has held the issue of appeal to be substantive; thus a federal court
sitting in diversity must apply not a federal rule, but instead the law of the forum state. In
Mooney v. Henderson Portion Pack Co., 334 F.2d 7 (6th Cir. 1964), a plaintiff who had
successfully prosecuted a personal injury action agreed to a remittitur under protest and then
appealed. The defendant moved to dismiss, depending upon the traditional federal view. The
court, in allowing the appeal, relied on the decision in Guaranty Trust Co. v. York, 326 U.S. 99
(1945), holding that the doctrine of that case obligated the federal court sitting in diversity to
apply the law of the state, in this case Tennessee, which permits a plaintiff who accepts a
remittitur under protest to appeal. Id. at 8-9. See Tenn. Code Ann. § 27-118 (1955). Despite the
subsequent decision of Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460 (1965), and criticism from the Seventh
Circuit in Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir.
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One circuit that has dealt with the question of appealability and has
continued to adhere to the traditional rule is the Seventh Circuit. In 1967,
Dorin v. Equitable Life Assurance Society of the United States13 presented

that court with a challenge to this traditional view. In Dorin, denial of the
defendant's motion for a new trial was conditioned upon remission by the
plaintiff of $157,500 of his award. The plaintiff agreed to the remittitur and
then filed a cross-appeal, claiming that the lower court had erred in ordering
any remittitur at all. Finding no abuse of discretion, the court adhered to the
traditional view that by accepting the remittitur the plaintiff had waived any
right to object to the order. 14 In reaching its decision, the court relied upon its
earlier decision in Casko v. Elgin, Joliet & Eastern Railway Co.15 In
dismissing the appeal in Casko, the court noted that if it allowed the plaintiff
to "appeal and cross-appeal" and then reversed the lower court's order, a
conditional order for a new trial would come into play. Such a result could
1967), the Sixth Circuit has reaffirmed its position. Burnett v. Coleman Co., S07 F.2d 726 (6th
Cir. 1974) (per curiam); Brewer v. Uniroyal, Inc., 498 F.2d 973 (6th Cir. 1974) (per curian);
Manning v. Altec, Inc., 488 F.2d 127 (6th Cir. 1973).
An opposing view as to the nature of appeal has been taken by the Seventh CircuiL In Dorin v.
Equitable Life Assurance Soc'y of the United States, supra, the plaintiff claimed that the Erie
doctrine dictated that the federal court sitting in diversity was obligated to apply the law of
Illinois. In Illinois, a plaintiff who accepts a reduced award is not precluded from asserting that
the original verdict was proper should the defendant appeal (1l. Rev. Stat. Ch. 1I0A,
§ 336(b)(2)(i) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975)). The Seventh Circuit refused to apply Illinois law,
holding that the plaintiff's decision to accept the remittitur or face a new trial presented a
procedural issue, governed by federal rather than state law. 382 F.2d at 79. The court declared
that to apply the Illinois statute in this situation would be inherently unfair, giving an Illinois
plaintiff who accepts a remittitur a "shot" at reinstating the original verdict without the expense
or risk of a new trial, so long as his opponent appealed and was unsuccessful. Id. at 78-79.
If the opportunity to appeal is viewed as a substantive right, each federal court sitting in
diversity must apply the various state rules in dealing with this issue. If appeal is procedural,
however, as the Second, Seventh and, by implication, Fifth Circuits have held, the federal courts
need not concern themselves with fifty state policies in this area and may either reject appeal or
institute a rule similar to that implemented in the Fifth Circuit. It would seem that, while the
Sixth Circuit approach might have been correct under the Guaranty Trust "outcome-determinative" test, it no longer has validity in light of the doctrine of Hanna v. Plumer, supra. As the
Court there stated in declaring the rule in question procedurah "Though choice of the federal or
state rule will at this point have a marked effect upon the outcome of the litigation, the difference
between the two rules would be of scant, if any, relevance to the choice of a forum." 380 U.S. at
469. The availability of a remittitur appeal would not seem to be the type of consideration that
would dictate initial choice of a forum. See id. at 475 (Harlan, J., concurring). Therefore, it
would seem to be a procedural matter within the guidelines of Hanna and Erie R.R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), and application of federal procedural rules for appealability of
remittitur would seem to be proper.
13. 382 F.2d 73 (7th Cir. 1967).
14. Id. at 78-79. In Koenigsberger v. Richmond Silver Mining Co., IS8 U.S. 41 (1895), the
Court stated that the plaintiff, by accepting the remittitur in lieu of facing a new trial, had
"waived all right to object to the order of the court, of the benefit of which he had availed
himself." Id. at 52.
15. 361 F.2d 748 (7th Cir. 1966).
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have been achieved by the plaintiff, merdy by his refusal to remit part of the
award. 16 More important, in the court's view, was the effect of such a
reversal. If the remittitur order was reversed, the original judgment would
be reinstated. Not being final, it could not be reviewed by an appellate
court. 17

While the Seventh Circuit in Casko and Dorin refused to liberalize its
stand, the Fifth Circuit gave an early indication of its willingness to change
the traditional view in 1963. In Delta EngineeringCorp. v. Scott, t 8 the court,
in dictum, stated that a plaintiff who had accepted a remittitur but had not
yet collected the judgment could challenge the propriety of the order itself on
appeal. 19 Delta intimated a willingness on the court's part to dissociate itself
from the predominant view. However, hopes of liberalization seemed premature since in 1965, in Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley,2 0 the court dismissed a
cross-appeal challenging an order of remittitur, citing as "old and established
law"2' the view that a plaintiff who has elected to accept a remittitur has
waived the right to appeal.
Yet, one year after this decision, the Fifth Circuit abandoned the traditional approach in favor of a more flexible one. In Steinberg v. Indemnity
Insurance Co. of North America, 22 the plaintiff, relying on the Delta dictum,
consented to a remittitur under protest and refused to accept the fruits of the
judgment. 23 The court, in allowing the appeal, formally accepted the Delta
dictum as the rule of the circuit. 24 Succeeding decisions have stressed two
16. Id. at 751.
17. See id. In Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79 (1917), the Court stated that "[l1f the
remittitur be disregarded the judgment entered upon it must be disregarded and the original
judgment of the Circuit Court of Appeals restored, which, not being final, cannot be reviewed."
Id. at 82. But see text accompanying notes 28-30 infra.
18. 322 F.2d 11 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
19. "We would assume, without deciding, that until such time as a plaintiff has actually
obtained the fruits of a judgment . . . he is free to challenge the legal correctness of the
Court-enforced remittitur. It would be a strange rule that would keep a plaintiff from challenging
the legal correctness of any action having such portentous consequences." Id. at 15.
20. 346 F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1965).
21. "The appeal by the plaintiff below from the order of remittitur is wholly without merit. It
is old and established law that one who has secured a judgment cannot retract a condition to
which he assented in order to obtain it." Id. at 875. Nowhere in the decision is reference made to
the Delta dictum.
22. 364 F.2d 266 (5th Cir. 1966).
23. In this action, the trial court ordered the plaintiff to agree to a remittitur or face a new
trial. The plaintiff moved to vacate the conditional order of remittitur on the ground that the trial
court had abused its discretion in ordering a new trial, on its own motion, more than ten days
after judgment was entered on the verdict. The district court denied the plaintiff's motion,
Steinberg v. Indemnity Ins. Co., 36 F.R.D. 253 (E.D. La. 1964), and the appellate court refused
to entertain the plaintiff's appeal from the lower court's interlocutory order. 364 F.2d at 267.
24. "In Delta Engineering Corp. v. Scott, . . . we assumed without deciding that until such
time as a plaintiff actually has obtained the fruits of a judgment he or she is free to challenge the
legal correctness of the Court-enforced remittitur. In the case here presented we are faced with
that issue squarely, and we hold that plaintiff here, who was refused an appeal on the
interlocutory order of remittitur and who has consented to entry of the reduced judgment only
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factors which are prerequisites to the maintenance of a successful appeal: first,
the reduced award must be accepted under protest, and second, the plaintiff
these elements, the court has not been
must not collect the judgment.2 5 Absent
26
willing to allow plaintiffs to appeal.
A frequently raised objection to any liberalization of the traditional rule has
the original verdict,
been that a reversal of the remittitur would reinstate
2
27
which, not being final, would not be reviewable. In Wiggs v. Courshon
the Fifth Circuit answered that argument, holding that the acceptance of a
remittitur under protest was a final judgment and thus appealable within the
guidelines of section 1291.29 The court reasoned that allowing the plaintiff to
appeal in such circumstances did not offend the policy against piecemeal
appeals:
If the remittitur was in order, the plaintiff has agreed to it, the judgment would be
final, and no new trial would be required. If the trial court erred in ordering the
remittitur, the appellate court could set aside the judgment and order that a judgment
be entered30on the jury verdict. Again, no new trial would be necessary to conclude the
litigation.

The Seventh Circuit rule, in forbidding absolutely any appeal by a plaintiff
who agrees to a remittitur, acts to bar meritorious as well as unfounded
claims. The Fifth Circuit rule, since it permits the court to exercise its
jurisdiction only if specific conditions are met, 3 1 is more liberal to the plaintiff
conditionally, as a means to facilitate this appeal, has suffered a sufficiently adverse adjudication
to allow an appeal. Moreover plaintiff has not collected the judgment as reduced." 364 F.2d at
268 (footnote omitted).
25. In Minerals & Chems. Philipp Corp. v. Milwhite Co., 414 F.2d 428 (Sth Cir. 1969), the
court dismissed an attempted cross-appeal of an order of remittitur, finding "[nio clement of
protest" present in the acceptance of the reduced sum. Id. at 431. The court also cited as
authority for the rule its decision in Movible. Nowhere in the Movible decision did the court
assert that acceptance of a remittitur under protest would permit review by the appellate court.
On the contrary, the court in Movible refused to permit any appeal at all, citing "old and
established law" as precedent. See note 21 supra.
26. The court did allow an appeal of a collected judgment in United States v. 1160.96 Acres
of Land, 432 F.2d 910 (5th Cir. 1970). In this eminent domain action, the court characterized the
defendants as "temporary stakeholders" of the funds, pending the government's appeal. Id. at
913. The major factor which impelled the court to allow the appeal despite the collection of
judgment was its belief that the government's actions in this case were violative of the fifth
amendment, with the result that the defendants were not able to truly choose between remittitur
or a new trial. Id. at 912-13.
27. See Woodworth v. Chesbrough, 244 U.S. 79, 82 (1917); Casko v. Elgin, Joliet & E. Ry.,
361 F.2d 748, 751 (7th Cir. 1966); Movible Offshore Co. v. Ousley, 346.F.2d 870 (5th Cir. 1965).
28. 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973).
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1291 (1970).
30. 485 F.2d at 1283.
31. Although remittitur may be appealed in the Fifth Circuit, the burden of proof which the
plaintiff must meet to win reinstatement of the original verdict is extremely high. Great deference
is given to the trial judge's belief that a remittitur was necessary to prevent an injustice. Delta
Eng'r Corp. v. Scott, 322 F.2d 11, 15-16 (5th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 905 (1964).
Reversal of the lower court's order of remittitur will occur only if the appellate court finds an
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32
but not at the expense of the defendant or the workload of the courts.
Until Reinertsen v. George W. Rogers Construction Corp., the Second
Circuit had remained relatively untouched by the controversy over appealability of remittitur. In the past, the only cases raising the problem in the circuit
have involved attempted cross-appeals by plaintiffs who have accepted remittiturs rather than face a new trial.
In Burris v. American Chicle Co.,33 the plaintiff agreed to remit a portion
of his $20,000 verdict rather than face a new trial. On cross-appeal, the
plaintiff asserted that the case was controlled by a New York statute 34 which
empowered the New York state courts to entertain a plaintiffs appeal
notwithstanding his acceptance of a reduced award. In dismissing the crossappeal after finding no abuse of discretion, 35 the court stated that a remittitur,
"if ever reviewable in a federal appellate court, can only be reviewed when
' 36
there has been a plain abuse of discretion.
Appealability was decisively rejected by the Second Circuit in Mattox v.
News Syndicate Co., 3 7 where the court reasoned that, had the plaintiff
refused to remit a part of the judgment, the trial judge would have ordered a
new trial because the verdict was excessive. Such an order would not be
appealable. 38 By accepting the remittitur and then attempting an appeal, the
' 39
plaintiffs position "was not bettered.
After the decisions in Burris and Mattox, the court appeared firmly to
adhere to the traditional approach holding that remittitur judgments were not
appealable. In Reinertsen, however, the court, while declining to rule directly
on the issue, did indicate a willingness to 0 liberalize its rule subject to
4
clarification of certain policy considerations.
One consideration was a fear that a change would drastically increase the

abuse of discretion, that is, if the jury's original verdict was "clearly within the universe of
possible awards .... " Bonura v. Sea Land Serv., Inc., 505 F.2d 665, 670 (5th Cir. 1974)
(emphasis omitted).
32. It appears that the Third Circuit may soon adopt a similar rule. In Thomas v. E.J.
Korvette, Inc., 329 F. Supp. 1163 (E.D. Pa. 1971), the district court allowed the plaintiff to
accept a remittitur under protest and appeal the propriety of the order. The Third Circuit, while
reversing, 476 F.2d 471 (3d Cir. 1973), remained silent on this point, intimating that in a proper
case it would not be averse to permitting such a procedure.
33.

120 F.2d 218 (2d Cir. 1941).

34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Civil Practice Act, § 584-a, Ch. 158, 162d Sess. [McKinney 1939] (repealed 1962).
The court refused to apply New York state law in this area. 120 F.2d at 223.
Id.
176 F.2d 897 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 338 U.S. 858 (1949).
An order granting a new trial is not appealable. Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Duncan, 311

U.S. 243, 254 (1940).
39.
176 F.2d at 904.

40. Before any change is contemplated, the Second Circuit must determine whether appeal Is
procedural or substantive within the meaning of the Erie rules. See note 12 supra. It is likely that
the court will find appeal procedural. In Reinertsen, the circuit allied itself with the view of the
Seventh Circuit. Moreover, in its Burris decision, the Second Circuit refused to apply a similar
New York statute which empowered the New York courts to entertain appeals of remittltur
judgments. See notes 33-35 supra and accompanying text.
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court's workload. 4 1 The fear arises that all plaintiffs will accept a remittitur
under protest and then appeal in the hope that the appellate court will
reinstate the original jury verdict. Such fears seemingly are unfounded. As the
plaintiffs in Reinertsen typified, the great majority of cases affected by such a
change will be personal injury cases, usually handled on a contingent fee
basis. The court recognized that it is unreasonable to expect any attorney to
prosecute an appeal if the chances for reversal are slim.4 2 Presumably, the
only decisions appealed will be those which seem "flagrantly wrong.'1 3 Also,
if the change increases the workload of the appellate court, it also decreases
that of the district court, where the second trial would take place if a
remittitur is refused. The Second Circuit noted that the 'Increased workload"
argument is further weakened when one realizes that the new procedure has
been enthusiastically embraced in the busiest of all circuits, the Fifth."
If the rationale of the Fifth Circuit in Wiggs v. Courshon45 were accepted,
such an appeal also would not undermine the policy against piecemeal
appeals. The court would either reverse for an abuse of discretion or affirm if
the remittitur were judged proper. In either case, no new trial would be
necessary, since in accepting the remittitur the plaintiff had already accepted
the acknowledged maximum award permissible. Given the narrow scope of
review and the deference given a trial court's decision that the remittitur was
necessary, 46 it is unlikely that many plaintiffs will appeal an order of
remittitur.
Another deterrent to wholesale appeals of a remittitur judgment is that,
while a plaintiff who accepts a remittitur under protest and then appeals has
an opportunity to reinstate the original jury verdict, such a decision will cost
him a right to a second trial and the possibility of a higher verdict which a
trial judge would be reluctant to disturb.4 7 Despite weighing these considerations, the Reinertsen court was still reluctant to adopt the Fifth Circuit
practice in light of Supreme Court decisions which have uniformly held a
48
remittitur judgment to be unappealable.
Thus, the present rule accepted in most circuits presents only one option to
a plaintiff who truly believes that the order of remittitur was improper:
submit to a new trial. Many plaintiffs, fearful that a second verdict will result
in an even smaller award, 49 reluctantly accept a remittitur. Under the
procedure adopted by the Fifth Circuit, such a plaintiff could seek immediate
appeal in the hope that the higher court will vindicate his belief and reinstate
the original verdict. Moreover, under such a procedure, those plaintiffs who
41.

519 F.2d at 535.

42.

Id.

43. Id. at 535-36.
44. See id.
45. 485 F.2d 1281 (5th Cir. 1973).
46. See note 31 supra.
47. 519 F.2d at 535.
48. Id. at 536. See note 9 supra.
49. For example, Reinertsen was awarded $75,000 at his first trial and $16,000 at the second.
519 F.2d at 532.
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elect a new trial will have made a true choice and will be unable to complain
if the second verdict is smaller than the original reduced award.
Whether the Second Circuit adopts a more liberal stance in this area s ° or
adheres to the traditional federal view, its discussion of the different procedures utilized by various courts demonstrates the confusion which has arisen
with respect to this issue. Only a definitive Supreme Court decision will
resolve the conflict and establish uniformity among the circuits. Such a
decision in favor of a more flexible approach should be advocated; but,
indeed, any decision that will resolve the present confusion would be welcomed.
Catherine A. Foddai

Criminal Law-Hobbs Act-De Jure Power Not Required As Element
of Extortion "Under Color of Official Right."--Defendant Mazzei, a
Pennsylvania state senator learned that Kelly, secretary-treasurer of B.M.I.,
Inc., was seeking tenants for an office building owned by B.M.I. Following a
meeting between Kelly and defendant at which leases were not discussed in
detail, the premises were inspected by a representative of the state's Department of Property and Supplies,' to determine its suitability for use as a
regional office of the Bureau of State Lotteries. Defendant, of his own
volition, visited Kelly and suggested the rental bid which should be submitted
to the state. It was at this meeting that defendant informed Kelly "that 'it was
the practice on all state leases that a ten percent of the gross amount of the
rentals would be paid to a senate finance re-election committee .
' 2
Although Mazzei had no actual authority to award state leases nor to
determine the amount that the state would pay for office space, the rental
suggested by defendant was proposed by Kelly and accepted by the state.
Shortly thereafter, defendant approached Kelly's banker, an intermediary at
various points in the negotiations, to inquire if Kelly had left an envelope for
him. The message was relayed to Kelly who authorized the withdrawal, and
delivery to defendant, of an amount equal to ten percent of the gross rental.
Subsequently, defendant contacted Kelly and arranged a second rental between B.M.I. and a state agency. Again he received ten percent of the gross3
rental. Defendant was convicted on two counts of violating the Hobbs Act,
50. In Reinertsen, the Second Circuit intimated a willingness to relax the traditional vlev
where cross-appeals were involved. In such situations, the case would have to be considered by
the appellate court on defendant's appeal. Where the plaintiff cross-appeals from a judgment
which he has accepted without protest, he is, in the court's view, "in a less equitable posture." Id.
at 534 n.3.
1. This is the agency charged with renting office space for the state. United States v. Mazzel,
521 F.2d 639, 641 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 446 (1975).
2. Id.
3. 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1970). The Act reads in pertinent part: "(a) Whoever in any way or
degree obstructs, delays, or affects commerce or the movement of any article or commodity In

19761

RECENT DEVELOPMENTS

the federal anti-extortion statute. The Third Circuit affirmed defendant's
conviction 4 following the denial of motions for a judgment of acquittal and a
new trial.5
The Third Circuit, having found an adequate basis for jurisdiction, 6 held
commerce, by robbery or extortion or attempts or conspires so to do, or commits or threatens
physical violence to any person or property in furtherance of a plan or purpose to do anything in
violation of this section shall be fined not more than $10,000 or imprisoned not more than twenty
years, or both. (b) As used in this section . .. (2) The term 'extortion' means the obtaining of
property from another, with his consent, induced by wrongful use of actual or threatened force,
violence, or fear, or under color of official right."
4. 521 F.2d at 646. While affirming the conviction, the court modified the judgment of the
district court. The court below, acting pursuant to a Pennsylvania statute which provided for
expulsion from public office upon conviction of extortion or other specified crimes, ordered
defendant expelled from his office as a state senator. The Third Circuit held that the district court
was without the power to impose a punishment not provided for in the statute under which
defendant was convicted. Id.
5. United States v. Mazzei, 390 F. Supp. 1098 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
6. 521 F.2d at 642-43. B.M.I., a holding company whose subsidiaries are engaged in
interstate commerce, can be identified with its subsidiaries for purposes of finding that B.M.I.
itself is engaged in interstate commerce. Defendant contended, however, that as the lease
agreement had no characteristics of an interstate commerce transaction, jurisdiction was lacking.
Id.at 642.
The courts have been extremely liberal in finding that various extortionate acts have sufficient
effects on interstate commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Hobbs AcL See,
e.g., United States v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1070 (1972);
United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972)
(construction project utilized materials that traveled interstate); United States v. De?*1asi, 445
F.2d 251 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 882 (1971) (nightclub's purchase of food and liquor);
United States v. Amabile, 395 F.2d 47 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971)
(extortion depleted reserves of contractor who depended on interstate commerce for supplies);
United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 924 (1971)
(depletion of victim's resources by extortion affected his ability to pay for interstate shipments);
Hulahan v. United States, 214 F.2d 441 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 856 (1954) (threats by
union leader of work stoppages made to contractor using out-of-state building materials). It has
been held that where the extortion obstructs interstate commerce "in any way or degree," the
courts have jurisdiction under the Hobbs Act. United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49. 76 (3d
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972) (emphasis omitted).
The depletion of resources test applied in the instant case is perhaps the most liberal. The test
was also applied in United States v. Augello, 451 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S.
1070 (1972) (small drive-in restaurant is victim of extortion; its assets are depleted and its ability
to purchase products in interstate commerce is inhibited, which is a sufficient impact on interstate
commerce to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Act). The amount of the reserves which
are depleted in relation to the total assets of the corporation are generally not considered.
The Seventh Circuit has gone so far as to hold that the jurisdictional element of the Hobbs Act
can be satisfied where there is no actual effect on commerce. The realistic probability that an
extortionate transaction will affect commerce was held to satisfy this element. United States v.
Staszcuk, 517 F.2d 53, 59-60 (7th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 96 S. CL 65 (1975).
The trend in broadening the basis upon which extortionate acts affect interstate commerce in
order to satisfy the jurisdictional requirements of the Act has been broken in United States v.
Merolla, 523 F.2d 51 (2d Cir. 1975). The Second Circuit held that where a victim is not an
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that defendant's actions constituted extortion "under color of official right,"'7
despite the fact that "defendant had no statutory power as a state senator to
control the granting of leases by state executive agencies." Defendant could
be convicted if the jury had "a reasonable belief that the state system so
operated that the power in fact of defendant's office included the effective
authority to determine recipients of the state leases . . . . "9 While the court
acknowledged that an element of the crime was misuse of official power,10 it
found that if the victim reasonably believed that the defendant had de jure
authority to control the awarding of leases, this element was satisfied."
United States v. Mazzei, 521 F.2d 639 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 446
(1975).
The term "under color of official right" is not defined in the Hobbs Act
itself. The legislative histories of the Act 12 and its predecessor, the AntiRacketeering Act of 1934,13 give no assistance in discovering its meaning.' 4
on-going purchaser of goods in interstate commerce, the fact that the extortion scheme delays or
obstructs goods in interstate commerce is insufficient to have the requisite effect upon commerce
required by the Act. Id. at 54-55.
7. 521 F.2d at 645; see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1970).
8. 521 F.2d at 643.
9. Id.
10. Id. at 643-44. In holding that misuse of official power was the element of coercion
required to establish extortion, the court explicitly rejected defendant's contention that he had
merely accepted a bribe rather than committed extortion. Id. at 644. The bribery-extortion
.dichotomy surfaced in United States v. Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49, 72 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 936 (1972), where the court said that "while the essence of bribery is voluntariness, the
essence of extortion is duress." In "under color of official right" prosecutions, the distinction is
rendered moot. Stern, Prosecutions of Local Political Corruption Under the Hobbs Act: The
Unnecessary Distinction Between Bribery and Extortion, 3 Seton Hall L. Rev. 1, 17 (1971). But
see Note, Extortion "Under Color of Official Right": Federal Prosecution of Official Corruption
under the Hobbs Act, 5 Loyola U. Chi. L.J. 513, 527-30 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Loyola Note].
11. 521 F.2d at 645. The dissenting opinion of Judge Gibbons generally disputes this
proposition. Id. at 646-47.
12. H.R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. (1945) (1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1360); 91
Cong. Rec. 11839-48, 11899-922 (1945).
13. Act of June 18, 1934, ch. 569, §§ 1-6, 48 Stat. 979-80.
14. The Anti-Racketeering Act was one of a series of statutes aimed at curtailing the activities
of professional gangsters. 78 Cong. Rec. 5735 (1935) (remarks of Senator Stephens). Seven or
eight bills were submitted to the Congress by the Department of Justice. Some of the activities
made illegal by these bills were interstate flight from prosecution, interstate transportation of
kidnapped persons and bank robbery. Id. at 5734-38.
A letter from Attorney General Homer Cummings to Congressman Sumners of the House
Judiciary Committee explained the government's purpose in proposing the Act. Pertinent portions
of the letter follow:
"As the typical racketeering activities affecting interstate commerce are those in connection
with price fixing and economic extortion directed by professional gangsters, [we have made] such
activities unlawful when accompanied by violence and affecting interstate commerce.
"The Sherman Antitrust Act is too restricted in its terms and the penalties thereunder are too
moderate to make that act an effective weapon in prosecuting racketeers. The antiracketeering
bill would extend the Federal jurisdiction in those cases where racketeering acts are related to
interstate commerce and are therefore of concern to the Nation as a whole. . ..
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The Congressional debates which preceded passage of the Hobbs Act indicated that the Act was patterned after the New York extortion statute.I It is
unclear, however, whether New York law was meant to be the basis for
interpreting the Hobbs Act. 16 In United States v. Meyers, 17 the district court,
in holding that "[a] mere candidate for public office can not obtain property
from another with that person's consent induced under color of official right,"
addressed the problem of interpreting "under color of official right."' 8 The
court decided that when a statute contains common law terms which are not
otherwise defined, the general practice is to apply the common law mean19
ing.
A leading Supreme Court case aiding the interpretation of this phrase,
Screws v. United States, 20 was decided not under the Hobbs Act, but rather
under a civil rights statute containing a clause that read "under color of
law. '2 1 In that case, defendant, a sheriff, arrested a black man who was later
beaten to death by defendant and his deputies while being transported to
jail. 22
The Court cited several factors which resulted in the finding that defendants' acts were committed "under color of law." The officers were authorized
(1) to arrest the defendant; (2) to keep him in custody by preventing escape;
and (3) to use necessary physical force to effectuate the arrest and retain
custody. Since defendants claimed that an escape was attempted, they were
"We feel that this bill is a vital part of any Federal program to suppress so-called 'racketeering' activities which have assumed Nation-wide proportions." H.R. Rep. No. 1833, 73d Cong.,
2d Sess. 2 (1934).

The limited legislative history indicates that this statute was concerned "with price fixing and
economic extortion... when accompanied by violence...." Id. The sole purpose of the Hobbs
Act was to amend the Anti-Racketeering Act to render extortionate conduct of labor unions and
their members illegal. In United States v. Teamsters Local 807, 315 U.S. 521, 530-31 (1942), the
Court held that the Anti-Racketeering Act of 1934 was inapplicable to this type of extortion. The
Hobbs Act was a direct response to this decision. H.R. Rep. No. 238, 79th Cong.. 2d Sess. (1945)
(1946 U.S. Code Cong. Serv. 1360-69).
15. 91 Cong. Rec. 11900 (1945) (remarks of Congressman Hancock); see Law of March 12,
1909, ch. 88, §§ 850-860 [N.Y. 1909] (repealed 1967) (reprinted in N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney
1967)).
16. Loyola Note, supra note 10, at 517.
17. 395 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Il. 1975).
18. Id. at 1070.
19. Id.
20. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
21. Act of March 4, 1909, ch. 321, § 20, 35 Stat. 1092, as amended, 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1970).
In United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299 (1941), the Court defined action taken under color of
state law as "[m]isuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only because
the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law .. . ." Id. at 326. Similar language is
found in United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910
(1975), which is a case decided under the Hobbs Act. "So long as the motivation for the payment
focuses on the recipient's office, the conduct falls within the ambit of [the Hobbs Act]." Id. at 151;
United States v. Meyers, 395 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Ill. 1975) (defendant could not be convicted for
extortion "under color of official right" where he held no office); see Loyola Note, supra note 10,
at 524.
22. 325 U.S. at 92-93.
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within their authority to protect themselves and to prevent the escape. As the
murder took place while the victim was allegedly escaping, the Court decided
of their
that the acts of the police officers at that time were within the purview
23
responsibilities. However, the officers misused their power.
It was the officers' actual authority to perform the acts that occurred, which
rendered their conduct "under color of law."
They acted without authority only in the sense that they used excessive force in
making the arrest effective. It is clear that under "color" of law means under
"pretense" of law. Thus acts of officers in the ambit of their personal pursuits are
plainly excluded. Acts of officers who undertake to perform their official duties
are
4
included whether they hew to the line of their authority or overstep it.2
Mazzei's actions, plainly adopted to further personal goals, would appear to
fall outside the Supreme Court's interpretation of "under color of law."
However, the applicability of Screws to the situation in Mazzei is limited, as
no court has yet expressly held that the terms "under color of law" and "color
of official right" are interchangeable for purposes of the Hobbs Act. 25
The Third Circuit, in finding that Mazzei's conduct did constitute extortion
under the Hobbs Act, relied heavily on United States v. Kenny. 26 Kenny held
that for a public official to commit extortion "under color of official right," it
is unnecessary to prove that the victim was coerced through " 'force, violence,
or fear.' ",27 The law is now well established that the Hobbs Act is disjunctive; 28 a public official need not go so far as to induce fear 29 or threaten
physical harm to commit extortion 3 0 The court in Mazzei thus concluded
that, under the common law, defendant's actions constituted extortion "under
color of official right" because he instilled in3 Kelly
a reasonable belief that he
1
had actual authority to grant state leases.
The court's decision that defendant's conduct constituted extortion in
violation of the Hobbs Act is not, however, supported by cases decided either
under the common law or the Hobbs Act. Extortion "under color of official
23.

Id. at 110; see United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941).

24.

325 U.S. at 111.

25.

See note 21 supra.

26.

462 F.2d 1205 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972).

27.
28.

Id. at 1229, quoting 18 U.S.C. § 1951(b)(2) (1970).
E.g., United States v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992, 994 (7th Cir. 1974); United States v.

Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205,

1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S.

914 (1972).

29. 504 F.2d at 994; 462 F.2d at 1229. The courts have found that payment made because of
the fear on the part of the victim that he would suffer an economic loss renders the conduct which
induced the fear extortionate. United States v. Dale, 223 F.2d 181, 183 (7th Cir. 1955); Bianchi v.
United States, 219 F.2d 182, 189 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S.

915 (1955).

Conduct is

extortionate if it induces a reasonable fear based upon what the victim believes defendant can do.
Callanan v. United States, 223 F.2d 171, 175 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 862 (1955) (victim's
belief that defendant, a labor leader, could provoke labor strife if not paid off was reasonable).
30. 521 F.2d at 645; United States v. Kenny, 462 F.2d 1205, 1229 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 914 (1972); Loyola Note, supra note 10, at 424.
31.

521 .F.2d at 643-45.
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right" requires a misuse of a public office, 32 which is distinct from a public
official's misuse of his personal power. 33 The court failed to address this
distinction.
In United States v. Braasch,34 defendants were police officers who, for a
fee, "protected" taverns and nightclubs from police harassment. 3S In eliciting
these payments the police officers were clearly acting outside the scope of their
official duties. However, in affirming defendants' convictions, the Seventh
Circuit said that
the evidence shows that the conspirators used the power and authority vested in them
by reason of their office to obtain money not due them or due the office. The use of
office to obtain payments is the crux of the statutory requirement of "under color of
official right", and appellants' wrongful use of official power was obviously the basis of
this extortion.... So long as the motivation for the payment focuses
on the recipient's
36
office, the conduct falls within the ambit of [the Hobbs Act].
In Braasch, the extortion was committed by police officers acting as police
officers. Payments were made to affect their official duties.
The instant case varies significantly, however. In Braasch, had defendants
not been police officers there would have been no extortion. 37 As pointed out
by the dissent in Mazzei, it was not defendant's office, but rather his influence
which enabled him to "[accomplish] the results for which the payments were
made. ' 38 The facts do not indicate that if defendant were not a state senator,
he would have been unable to secure the state lease for B.M.I. It is certainly
conceivable that others without official position could have influenced the
state agency to lease the property. Defendant's success in influencing the state
renting authority was a function of his personal political power and not
39
endemic to the office of state senator.
40
In United States v. Price, defendant, Chairman of the Charleston (South
Carolina) County Council, was convicted under the Hobbs Act for receiving
payment in exchange for an occupancy permit for a motel. The court held
that it was unnecessary to prove that defendant had de jure power to issue the
32. See, e.g., Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945); United States v. Classic, 313 U.S.
299 (1941); United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 150-51 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S.
910 (1975).
33. 521 F.2d at 650-51 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
34. 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975).
35. Id. at 142.
36. Id. at 151.

37. Only police officers were in a position to give police protection and ignore existing
violations of the law. No ordinary citizen could have performed these acts. Accord, United States
v. Crowley, 504 F.2d 992 (7th Cir. 1974) (police officer who extorted money in return for a

promise of increased police protection was guilty of extortion "under color of official right" bLsit
was within his official duties as a police officer to protect the dtizenry).
38. 521 F.2d at 647 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
39. Id.at 651.
40.

507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam).

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 44

41

permit. While the dictum in Price seems to support the Third Circuit's
Mazzei rationale, the cases are distinguishable on two grounds. First, there
was evidence that in Price, defendant's office gave him coercive power over
those city employees with actual authority to issue the permit. 4 2 As Chairman
of the County Council, Price had the actual power to control the acts of
subordinate officials. The defendant's power in Price to perform certain acts,
resulted from powers possessed by virtue of his office. Moreover, Price was
submitted to the jury on the alternative theories of extortion "under color of
official right" and "actual or threatened force, violence, or fear."'43 Therefore,
the value of Price, especially with respect to its dictum should be weighed
accordingly.
The Third Circuit in Mazzei also relied on United States v. Staszcuk44 to
support the proposition that de facto power to perform the illegal act was
sufficient for a conviction under the "color of official right" section of the
Hobbs Act. 45 Defendant Staszcuk was an alderman in Chicago who extorted
money from a "zoning consultant" 46 in exchange for assistance in obtaining a
41. Id. at 1350. In its charge to the jury, the district court had stated: " '[I]t is not necessary
[for conviction] that you conclude that the defendant could in fact assure the issuance of an
occupancy permit. . . . The issue.., is not whether the defendant had the power to withhold the
permit, but whether it was reasonable for [[the victim] to believe] that he ... had such power.' "
Id., quoting Transcript at 850-51.
42. 507 F.2d at 1350. The defendant told one of the victims of the extortion that the victims
could be assured of receiving their occupancy permits upon payment to defendant because "there
were several county employees 'hanging by a thread' whose jobs would be terminated if they
didn't obey [the defendant]." Id.
43. Id. at 1350 & n. 1. Virtually all the cases in which extortionate acts are committed by
public officials have involved the use of fear, and in particular, the fear of economic loss. See note
29 supra. Thus, even where the theory of extortion committed "under color of official right" is
available to the prosecution, the cases frequently utilize defendant's use of fear in securing
convictions under the statute. United States v. DeMet, 486 F.2d 816 (7th Cir. 1973), cert. denied,
416 U.S. 969 (1974) (nightclub owner paid police officers to prevent harassment); United States v.
Addonizio, 451 F.2d 49 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 936 (1972) (mayor of Newark
received kickbacks from contractors working on city projects); United States v. Hyde, 448 F.2d
815 (5th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1058 (1972) (Alabama Attorney General participated In
scheme to extort money from small insurance companies); United States v. Pranno, 385 F.2d 387
(7th Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 944 (1968) (alderman and building commissioner
threatened denial of building permits to prospective contractors).
In other instances, while the conviction is based upon defendant's actions "under color of
official right," "fear" could have been used to achieve identical results. United States v. Kenny,
462 F.2d 1205, 1215 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 914 (1972) (party boss who controlled local
government extracted tribute "from everyone who could be made amenable to such an exaction").
Several cases have been submitted to the jury on the alternative theories of extortion, "under
color of official right" and "fear." United States v. Price, 507 F.2d 1349 (4th Cir. 1974) (per
curiam) (discussed at notes 40-42 supra and accompanying text); United States v. Irali, 503 F.2d
1295 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975) (discussed at notes 51-53 infra and
accompanying text).
44. 502 F.2d 875 (7th Cir. 1974), aff'd in part on rehearing, 517 F.2d 53 (7th Cir.) (en
banc), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 65 (1975).
45. 521 F.2d at 643.
46. 502 F.2d at 877.
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desired 7zoning change. This was held to be extortion "under color of official
4
right."

The payments were made to defendant to influence his exercise of the political power
he held as alderman over zoning applications. To accept money in return for an
agreement not to oppose such applications-in effect to suspend independent judgment
on the merits of such zoning changes--constitutes obtaining property from another,
with his consent, induced under color of official right.48
Staszcuk dearly involved the use of an official position to promote the
extortion; were it not for the office, defendant could not have committed the
extortionate acts. The Mazzei court's reliance on Staszcuk is clearly misplaced. In Mazzei, public office was not essential to performance of the
extortionate acts.
The dissent in Mazzei also distinguishes that case from Price and Staszcuk
on the ground that "[n]either Price nor Staszcuk deal with payments for
influence over third-party conduct." 49 Both of those cases involved official
conduct-that is, the actual power of defendants5 -rather than the Mazzei
situation which involved influence over the official conduct of others.
While the dissent was correct in noting that Price and Staszcuk did not
involve payment to influence conduct of third persons, a recent case indicates
that Mazzei is not the sole instance in which a conviction was obtained under
the Hobbs Act for conduct which amounted to extortion by third-party
influence. In United States v. Irali,5 1 the victim purchased a tavern and went
to City Hall to secure a liquor license. Defendant, the principal clerk in the
liquor license department in the City Collector's office, had no discretionary
authority to issue licenses, but he told the victim that the investigating police
officer, who had discretionary power to approve license applications, was
demanding to be paid prior to approving the license. The demand was met,
and the victim received the license. The court stated:
Although Irali, as a principal clerk in the liquor license department of the City
Collector's office could only have delayed or at worst lost the application, the person
on whose behalf he said he spoke, [the investigating police officer], had an official
position in which he could recommend that the license not be issued. Accordingly,
there was sufficient evidence for the jury to have found that Irali, acting either under
his own position or purportedly5 2through [the police officer's] position, affected interstate commerce by extortion.
However, the applicability of frali to Mazzei is limited. The Irali court held
that there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that Irali could
commit extortion "under color of official right" through the use of his own
47. Id.
48. Id. at 878.
49. 521 F.2d at 650 (Gibbons, J., dissenting).
50. Although the official power to perforni a particular act rests in one state official, the
circumstances may be such that another official, through his ability to control the first official,
will have the actual power to perform the act in question. See notes 40-41 supra and accompanying text.
51. 503 F.2d 1295 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 990 (1975).
52. Id. at 1300-01.
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official position.5 3 This differs from Mazzei, in that Senator Mazzei used his
personal power rather than an office which he did not hold.
Since "under color of official right" is undefined in the Hobbs Act, the
Third Circuit found it necessary to use the common law to justify its position.
54
At common law, extortion could only be committed by a public official. It
was originally limited to those instances where a public official either took a
fee where none was permitted or, if a fee were permitted, demanded and
received an amount in excess of what was legally permitted.-- This limited
definition of extortion was expanded by the courts to include any money
received by a public official, by color of his office, not due him.5 6 Extortion as
the term is commonly used today-the use of fear or threats to induce another
to pay money-is statutory in origin. 57 At least one state which has adopted a
"color of official
statute similar to the Hobbs Act has held that extortion under
58
right" is identical under common law and statutory law.
The Third Circuit implied that the common law supported its position that
reasonable belief of de facto power by another was sufficient to find that
defendant's actions were "under color of official right."5 9 The dissent of Judge
Gibbons reviewed the limited applicability of common law extortion 6 and
concluded that defendant's conduct did not constitute common law extortion. 61 This is clearly the better view.
53. Id. The facts indicate a stronger case for conviction under "force, violence or fear" than
"under color of official right." The victim was fearful that if she were unable to obtain a liquor
license within a short period of time, she would have been forced to sell the tavern. Id.at 1298.
This fear of economic loss is sufficient to sustain a conviction under the Hobbs Act. Id.at 1300;
see note 29 supra.
54. Commonwealth v. Coolidge, 128 Mass. 55, 58 (1880); People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661
(N.Y. 1827); 3 R. Anderson, Wharton's Criminal Law and Procedure § 1392 (1957). "At common
law it was essential that the money or property be obtained under color of office, that Is, under
the pretense that the officer was entitled thereto by virtue of his office. The money or thing
received must have been claimed or accepted in right of office, and the person paying must have
yielded to official authority. If a person who happens to be a public officer renders a service in his
private capacity and demands a payment therefor or makes any demand in his private capacity, it
is not technically extortion because not made under color of office." Id. § 1393 (footnote omitted).
See also 1 J. Bishop, Criminal Law § 587 (9th ed. 1923); K. Sears & H. Weihofen, May's Law of
Crimes § 81 (4th ed. 1938).
55. K. Sears & H. Weihofen, May's Law of Crimes § 81 (4th ed. 1938).
56. In People v. Whaley, 6 Cow. 661 (N.Y. 1827), the court broadened this limited definition.
In that case, a magistrate obtained payment from a defendant in a civil suit under the pretense
that the suit had been adjourned, when in reality it had been dismissed. "Extortion signifies, in
an enlarged sense, any oppression under color of right. In a stricter sense, it signifies the taking of
money by any officer, by color of his office . . . . " Id. at 663.

57. E.g., Law of March 12, 1909, ch. 88, §§ 850-860 [N.Y. 1909] (repealed 1967) (reprinted In
N.Y. Penal Law (McKinney 1967)).
58. State v. Weleck, 10 N.J. 355, 91 A.2d 751 (1952). The New Jersey statute reads as
follows: "Any judge, magistrate or public officer who, by color of his office, receives or takes any
fee or reward not allowed by law for performing his duties, is guilty of a misdemeanor." N.J.
Stat. Ann. § 2A:105-1 (1969).
59. 521 F.2d at 643.
60. See notes 53-55 supra and accompanying text.
61. 521 F.2d at 651 (Gibbons, J., dissenting); see Loyola Note, supra note 10, at 518-20.
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The decision of the Third Circuit was erroneous in that it failed fully to
comprehend the meaning of "under color of official right." The courts have
consistently required that to be acting "under color of official right," a public
officer must be using his office to achieve an illegal goal. The effect of the
Mazzei decision is to render all public officials, who influence others in
government to take certain actions, susceptible to prosecution under the
Hobbs Act, while leaving private individuals who engage in similar conduct
subject only to state criminal statutes. 62 That identical conduct can be
undertaken by private individuals, without subsequent Hobbs Act prosecution, demonstrates that the historical concept that only a public official could
commit crimes "under color of official right," has been ignored by the Third
Circuit. While the type of conduct engaged in by State Senator Mazzei is
condemnable, it is not within the province of the courts to distort statutes to
achieve a result they deem desirable. State failures to police its officials
properly should not be carte blanche to the federal judiciary to attempt to
rectify all social evils.
Jay D. Lukowski

Criminal Law-Scienter-Intent Not Required for Conviction of Carrying Concealed Deadly Weapon Aboard Aircraft.-At the security post of
Lincoln Municipal Airport, Nebraska, security guards discovered that
Thomas Flum was carrying a switchblade knife with a three and three
quarters inch blade inside a small box and a butcher knife with a seven and
seven eighths inch blade wrapped in loose clothing in his suitcase. Flum was
arrested and convicted in a jury-waived trial for attempting to board an
aircraft while having about his person a concealed deadly or dangerous
weapon' in violation of the Federal Aviation Act of 1958.2
In contesting his conviction, defendant Flum argued that the government
was required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he had the specific
intent to conceal a deadly or dangerous weapon, while attempting to board
the flight. The government argued that while sufficient evidence of intent to
conceal existed, the statute required no proof of specific intent. 3 The United
States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, sitting en banc, upheld Flum's
62. Only government officials are subject to prosecution under the Hobbs Act. United States
v. Meyers, 395 F. Supp. 1067 (E.D. Ill. 1975).
1. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 40-41 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
2. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(1) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Except for law enforcement officers
...
who are authorized or required to carry arms, and except for such other persons as may be so
authorized . . . whoever, while aboard an aircraft being operated by an air carrier in air
transportation, has on or about his person a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon, or whoever
attempts to board such an aircraft while having on or about his person a concealed deadly or
dangerous weapon, shall be fined not more than $1,000 or imprisoned not more than one )ear, or
both."
3. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 40-41 (8th Cir. 1975) (en bane).
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conviction,, finding that the statute required no specific intent to conceal a
deadly or dangerous weapon. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir.
1975) (en banc).
4
In recent years, commercial aviation has become the target for air pirates.
To forestall this growing problem of air-hijacking, Congress enacted a series
of amendments to the Federal Aviation Act,5
to extend Federal criminal laws to certain acts committed on board aircraft-in
particular, such acts as aircraft 'hijacking', murder, manslaughter, assault, maiming,6
carrying concealed deadly or dangerous weapons, and stealing personal property.
Congress felt that the broad coverage of the proposed legislation was the only
viable approach to eliminating the loopholes in the existing law.7 One such
amendment, section 1472(1),8 prohibits the carrying of a concealed deadly or
dangerous weapon while aboard or attempting to board an aircraft.
The courts have faced two major problems in determining the essential
elements of this offense-whether the statute requires mens rea or specific
intent to conceal and what objects are included in the term "deadly or
dangerous weapon." In view of the lack of definition of the term "deadly or
dangerous weapon" in the legislation, a construction of section 1472(1) which
allows for valid prosecution without a showing of specific intent to carry a
concealed weapon on board an aircraft could result in criminal liability for
innocent air travelers. Under these circumstances, selective and arbitrary law
enforcement would appear unavoidable.
In determining whether specific intent may be implied from the nature of a
particular statute when there is no explicit intent requirement, the courts have
4. Rosenfield, Air Piracy: Is It Time To Relax Our Security?, 9 New Eng. L. Rev. 81, 84
(1973). Between the years 1947 and 1957, there were only sixteen attempted hijackings In the
world. In the four year span of 1958 to 1961, there were twenty-seven attempted hijackings
throughout the world. See also Volpe & Stewart, Aircraft Hijacking: Some Domestic and
International Responses, 59 Ky. L. J. 273 (1970); Symposium, Skyjacking: Problems and
Potential Solutions, 18 Vill. L. Rev. 985 (1973); Comment, Skyjacking: Constitutional Problems
Raised by Anti-Hijacking Systems, 63 J. Crim. L.C. & P.S. 356 (1972); Note, The Antiskyjack
System: A Matter of Search-or Seizure, 48 Notre Dame Law. 1261 (1973).
5. H.I R. Rep. No. 958, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961); 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Ad. News 2563
(1961) [hereinafter cited as Administrative News]. "Recent events have demonstrated the urgent
need for stronger Federal laws applicable to criminal acts committed aboard commercial and
private aircraft.
A series of acts of a criminal nature recently committed aboard aircraft has dramatically
underscored the gaps in existing law which can operate to provide criminals with a haven from
prosecution." Id.

6. Administrative News, supra note 5, at 2563.
7. "The committee feels that it is necessary and appropriate for the legislation to have this
broad coverage if it is to operate as an effective deterrent to crime and promote safety in air
commerce. While the legislation is intended to be as broad in its coverage, geographic and
otherwise, as its plain meaning indicates, it is not intended-and, of course, it cannot-extend
beyond such limitations as may be imposed by the Constitution." Id. at 2564.
8. See note 2 supra.
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looked to several aspects of the statute, including the common law background of the crime, the policy behind the statute and the legislative purpose
of enactment. 9
Statutes which do not require criminal intent are often regulatory in nature
and the offense is one that has not been incorporated from the common law.
In Morissette v. United States, 10 the Supreme Court distinguished between
those offenses which by their very nature are inimical to the public welfare
and those offenses incorporated from the common law. Defendant therein had
been convicted of converting spent government bomb casings which he had
discovered while hunting." Although the statute involved made no reference
to intent, 12 the Court held that the crime, larceny, was incorporated from the
common law13 and that consequently, an intent element was inherent in the
statutory offense.1 4 The Court, however, stated that many statutory offenses
are not in the nature of positive aggressions or invasions, with which the common law
so often dealt, but are in the nature of neglect where the law requires care, or inaction
where it imposes a duty ....Hence, legislation applicable to such offenses, as a matter
of policy, does not specify intent as a necessary element."
Strong policy considerations override the necessity of showing that the act was
criminally motivated. These regulatory statutes often involve an exercise of
police power, aimed at social betterment rather than at the punishment of
crimes. 16 To require a showing of the defendant's state of mind would defeat
their purpose. Among such public welfare offenses are included: illegal sale of
intoxicating liquor, sale of impure or adulterated food or drugs, sales of
misbranded articles, and violations of police regulations passed for the benefit
of the community.' 7 Statutes establishing such criminal liability without mens
rea have been upheld by the Supreme Court as not violative of due process of
9. Holdridge v. United States, 282 F.2d 302, 310 (8th Cir. 1960). "t Vhere a federal criminal
statute omits mention of intent and where it seems to involve what is basically a matter of policy,
where the standard imposed is, under the circumstances, reasonable and adherence thereto
properly expected of a person, where the penalty is relatively small, where conviction does not
gravely besmirch, where the statutory crime is not one taken over from the common law, and
where congressional purpose is supporting, the statute can be construed as one not requiring
criminal intent. The elimination of this element is then not violative of the due process clause."
Id.
10. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
11. Id. at 248.
12. 18 U.S.C. § 641 (1970) provides in pertinent part "Whoever embezzles, steals, purloins, or
knowingly converts to his use or the use of another . . . any record, voucher, money, or thing
of value of the United States or of any department or agency thereof ..... (s~hall be fined ...or
imprisoned . .. ."

13.

342 U.S. at 260. "Stealing, larceny, and its variants and equivalents, were among the

earliest offenses known to the law that existed before legislation . . . ." Id.

14. Id. at 263.
15. Id.at 255-56.
16. United States v. Balint, 258 U.S. 250, 252 (1922).
17. For a complete discussion of public welfare offenses, see Sayre, Public Welfare Offenses,
33 Colum. L. Rev. 55 (1933).
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defendant had

argued that punishing an involuntary trespass without a showing of intent
was a violation of due process of law. 20 The Court, in upholding the
constitutionality of the statute involved, stated that "public policy may

require that in the prohibition or punishment of particular acts it may be
provided that he who shall do them shall do them at his
peril and will not be
'2 1
heard to plead in defense good faith or ignorance."
However, not all regulatory statutes mandate strict liability. In United
States v. Freed,22 defendants were convicted under the National Firearms
Act 23-a regulatory statute-of possession of hand grenades, a firearm within
the statute's proscription. 2 4 Although the Court found the statute in question

to be "a regulatory measure in the interest of the public safety,"25 Mr. Justice

Brennan's concurring opinion noted that the prosecution was required to

prove that defendants knowingly possessed hand grenades. 26 The Court, in
United States v. InternationalMinerals & Chemical Corp.,27 made clear that

Justice Brennan's observation concerning the knowledge requirement of the
subsection of the National Firearms Act was in fact the view held by the
majority in Freed.28 The statute in Freed is somewhat analogous to section
1472(l). Both proscribe the possession of dangerous weapons without explicitly
mentioning the element of intent. Unlike section 1472(l), however, the Na-

tional Firearms Act has defined what constitutes a firearm within its proscription. 29 It would appear that the Freed court was able to infer an intent
requirement from this strict definition. A person could not have such an
instrument in his possession without knowing that he was violating the law.
Thus far, the courts have been unwilling to construe section 1472(l) as

requiring specific intent to carry a deadly or dangerous weapon. 30 In United
18. See, e.g., Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246 (1952); United States v. Balint, 258
U.S. 250 (1922).
19. 218 U.S. 57 (1910).
20. Id. at 65. The statute in question made the defendant liable for cutting down timber on
state land without a valid permit Id. at 62.
21. Id. at 70.
22. 401 U.S. 601 (1971).
23. 26 U.S.C. § 5812 (1970).
24. Id. § 5845(0.
25. 401 U.S. at 609.
26. Id. at 612 (Brennan, J., concurring). Justice Brennan stated that the government must
prove three elements: "(1) that appellees possessed certain items; (2) that the items possessed were
hand grenades; and (3) that the hand grenades were not registered." Id.
27. 402 U.S. 558 (1971).
28. Id. at 560. "Here as in United States v. Freed . . . which dealt with the possession of
hand grenades, strict or absolute liability is not imposed ....
" Id.
29. 26 U.S.C. §§ 5845(a), (h) (1970).
30. See United States v. Margraf, 483 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 414 U.S. 1106
(1973), remanded with directions to dismiss, 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (conviction
under section 1472(1) vacated because knife defendant was carrying was not a deadly or
dangerous weapon within the statute's proscription); United States v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727,
732 (9th Cir. 1973) (starter pistol was not a deadly or dangerous weapon per se); United States v.
Lee, 383 F. Supp. 1033, 1035 (E.D. Tenn. 1974) (concealment of contraband in a legal sense Is
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States v. Margraf,3 1 defendant was convicted of a violation of section 1472().
Security guards had discovered a pocketknife with a three and a quarter inch
blade on his person after a positive reading registered on a magnometer (metal
screening device). Margraf contended that specific intent to carry a concealed
weapon onto the plane was an essential element of the offense. 32 The Third3
Circuit refused to read a specific intent requirement into section 1472(),3
noting that the congressional policy of protecting passengers on commercial
airlines from the dangers of hijacking was strong enough to override the need
for an intent element in the statute. 34 Furthermore, the fact that subsection
(in) of the same statute contained an express intent requirement" convinced
the court that Congress intended that such a requirement not be included
under subsection (1).36
The dissent felt that Margraf's conviction should be reversed because the
government had produced no evidence on whether or not the defendant knew
he was carrying a concealed deadly or dangerous weapon. It also disagreed
with the majority's conclusion that no intent or knowledge of any type need
be proven under section 1472 (0. The dissent claimed that at a minimum, the
government must prove three elements in order to sustain a conviction based
upon this section: (1) that defendant was carrying a concealed deadly or
dangerous weapon; (2) that defendant knew that what he was carrying was a
deadly or dangerous weapon; and (3) that the defendant attempted to board a
commercial aircraft carrying that concealed weapon. 37 The dissent in Margraf
seemed to be analyzing section 1472(1) in much the same way as the Freed
court had approached its construction of the National Firearms Act. This
interpretation of the statute would appear to eliminate problems of vagueness
and overbreadth that otherwise might exist under section 1472(t). However,
the courts have dismissed this interpretation of the statute in favor of one of
strict liability, resting their conclusions on the congressional policy behind the
statute.
The problem of an intent requirement and the possible difficulties with
knowing concealment which is to be distinguished from knowledge of its illegal character); United
States v. Harris, 381 F. Supp. 1095, 1101 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (no proof of knowledge or intent is
required).
31. 483
to dismiss,
32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.

F.2d 708 (3d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973), remanded with directions
493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
at 709.
at 710-11.

35. 49 U.S.C. § 1472(m) (1970) provides in pertinent part: "Whoever imparts or conveys or
causes to be imparted or conveyed false information, knowing the information to be false,
concerning an attempt or alleged attempt being made or to be made, to do any act which would
be a crime prohibited by subsection (i), (j), (k), or (1) of this section, shall be fined . . . or
imprisoned . . . or both."

36. "In view of the seriousness of the hijacking problem-both at the time of enactment and
at the present-it is reasonable to conclude that Congress meant paragraph (l) not to have a
specific intent requirement. To include a specific intent requirement would be judicial legislation,
and such inclusion could seriously hinder attempts at enforcing this statute." 483 F.2d at 710-11.
(footnote omitted).
37. Id. at 713.
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vagueness and overbreadth under section 1472() might lose their significance,
however, if the objects proscribed by the statute were more adequately
defined. Frequently, the intent to conceal requirement can be inferred from
the mere possession of a weapon specifically described in a deadly or dangerous weapon statute. 38 It is questionable, however, whether such intent could
be inferred under section 1472(1), since it does not provide sufficient warning
as to what objects are within its proscription.
Generally, a deadly or dangerous weapon is defined as "one which in its
intended or readily adaptable use is likely to produce death or serious bodily
injury. '39 The law distinguishes between those objects which are deadly or
dangerous per se and those objects which become so by reason of their use.
For example, a loaded weapon from which a shot readily capable of producing death or other serious physical injury may be discharged, or a switchblade
knife, gravity knife, dagger, billy, blackjack or metal knuckles have been
defined as per se deadly weapons under New York law. 40 Pennsylvania law
proscribes the carrying of any dirk, dagger, automatic or spring operated
knife. 4 1 California law prohibits the carrying of any dirk, dagger, automatic
42
or spring operated knife, and knife with a blade of longer than five inches.
On the other hand, a shoe, although not proscribed by law has been
held to
4 3
be a deadly or dangerous weapon in an instance of actual use.
The Federal Aviation Act contains no definition of what are deadly or
dangerous weapons per se. Congress believed that an attempt to define this
term in the anti-hijacking amendment would not be practicable. It preferred
that the courts determine what constituted a deadly or dangerous weapon on
a case by case basis. 44 Some sections of the anti-hijacking legislation would
lend themselves to this ad hoc determination more easily than would others.
For example, section 14720) deals with an assault on a flight crew member
with a deadly or dangerous weapon. 45 The deadly or dangerous nature of the
object involved can be determined by showing how it was used by the
defendant during the assault. On the other hand, section 1472() is a proscriptive statute and in enforcing it one does not have the benefit of hindsight.
38. See, e.g., United States v. Margraf, 483 F.2d 708, 715 (3d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 414
U.S. 1106 (1973), remanded with directions to dismiss, 493 F.2d 1208 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc);
State v. Jordan, 495 S.W.2d 717, 720 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
39. 94 C.J.S. Weapons § 6(c) (1956).
40. N.Y. Penal Law § 10(12) (McKinney 1975).
41. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 908 (Purdon 1973).
42. Cal. Penal Code §§ 12000-12029 (1970).
43. United States v. Barber, 297 F. Supp. 917, 923 (D. Del. 1969), aff'd, 442 F.2d 517 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971). See also, Medlin v. United States, 207 F.2d 33 (D.C. Cir.
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 905 (1954).
44. Administrative News, supra note 5, at 2570, 2575.
45. 49 U.S.C. § 14720) (1970). The House Report in discussing the term deadly or dangerous
weapon in subsection (j) stated that "[clonsideration was given to attempting to define the term
'deadly or dangerous weapon.' However, this is not practicable. These terms have been used
without definition in other provisions of title 18, United States Code, and in many State criminal
laws. The courts will determine in each case, as it arises, whether the weapon in question was
deadly or dangerous." Administrative News, supra note 5, at 2570.
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Congress' dismissal of the need of further definition of these terms in the
context of section 1472(1) seems to create serious problems for law enforcement officials who seek to apply it as well as for an unwary public who may
be victimized by it.
The variance of opinion as to what should be proscribed as a dangerous or
deadly weapon while attempting to board an aircraft is reflected in United
States v. Dishman.46 Defendant therein, was convicted of attempting to
board an aircraft with a starter pistol which, in the lower court's view, was
found to be a deadly or dangerous weapon. 47 The court of appeals, using an
encyclopedic definition for its guide in determining the deadly or dangerous
nature of the object in question, found as a matter of law, that the pistol was
not within the proscription of section 1472(t).48
In United States v. Margraf,49 defendant contended that the pocketknife he
was carrying was not a deadly or dangerous weapon for the purposes of
section 1472().50 The Margrafdecision was ultimately vacated and remanded
for dismissal of the government's complaint against Margraf, because the
court of appeals found that the FAA guidelines had not been adhered to by
the prosecution in determining whether the instrument was deadly or dangerous. 5' In 1973, the FAA, responding to the controversy over what constituted
a deadly or dangerous weapon, had provided some guidelines for making the
determination. 5 2 This promulgation only serves to demonstrate further the
46. 486 F.2d 727 (9th Cir. 1973).
47. Id. at 729 n.2.
48. Id. at 732.
49. 483 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 414 U.S. 1106 (1973), remanded with directions
to dismiss, 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
50. Id. at 710.
51. 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
52. The FAA guidelines provide: "'The following guidelines are furnished to airport operators, air carriers, law enforcement personnel, and others involved in preboard screening of
passengers in making a reasonable determination of what property... should be considered as a
weapon or dangerous object.
'FIREARMS-Including starter pistols, compressed air or BB guns and flare pistols.
'KNIVES-All sabres, swords, hunting knives, and such other knives considered illegal by
local law.
'BLUDGEONS-Blackjacks, billy dubs, or similar instruments.
'OTHER DEVICES OR OBJECT-Even though not commonly thought of as a dangerous
weapon but the possession of which supports the reasonable presumption that it could be used as
[sic] weapon, such as ice picks, straight razors, elongated scissors, and the like. Any questionable
device or object to include toy or dummy weapons or grenades should be treated as a dangerous
article.
" 'The following objects should also be prohibited in the interest of air security.
'EXPLOSIVESAMMUNITION-All types of explosives, ammunition, incendiaries, and fireworks whether commercially manufactured, homemade, or any combination of components to
produce same.
'GASES AND CHEMICAL AGENTS-All tear gas, mace, and similar chemicals and gases
whether in pistol, pen, canister, or other container.
"In those instances where an undeclared firearm or other obviously dangerous weapon is
discovered concealed in a carry-on bag or on the person of a passenger, appropriate law
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vague nature of section 1472(l). The guideline for determining what is a
deadly or dangerous weapon--"[e]ven though not commonly thought of as a
dangerous weapon but the possession of which supports the reasonable
presumption that it could be used as [a] weapon... " 53-does not furnish law
enforcement officials with any more explicit standard than that found in the
legislation itself.
According to this guideline, the starter pistol in Dishman would now come
within the section's proscription.- 4 When discussing certain objects such as
starter pistols, toy or candy pistols useable for the real thing, razor blades
useable as knives, and a businessman's letter opener, the court of appeals in
Dishman had stated that "Congress did not exercise its power to forbid the
carrying of such objects aboard airplanes and for [the court] to supply such
language to the subsection would not be a judicial construction of the statute
but on the contrary a judicial legislation of an ex post facto criminal law
.... "55 The judicial legislation of an ex post facto law each time the court is
confronted with the issue of whether a particular object is a deadly or
dangerous weapon is precisely the result that had been feared. 5 6 The majority
in Margrafhad stated that "[w]hile appellant may have considered his knife a
tool and not a knife or deadly weapon, he still should have been aware that it
could be used as a deadly weapon and that others could have classified it as
[such]." 57T Such a conclusion would seem erroneous in light of the Supreme
Court's rulings in Freed and InternationalMinerals which would make intent
a requisite under subsection ().58 It is not whether others might consider an
object to be a deadly or dangerous weapon; rather, the government must
prove that the defendant knew the object to be a dangerous or deadly
weapon. Only then can a conviction under section 1472(l) be sustained.5 9
The decision in Flum follows a long line of cases construing section 1472()
to be a non-intent statute. 60 The Eighth Circuit majority relied on Morissette
v. United States6 1 for the proposition that certain public welfare offenses
enforcement authorities must be notified.' " These guidelines are reproduced in United States v.
Margraf, 493 F.2d 1206, 1207 n.1 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc) (emphasis deleted).
53. Id.
54. Id.
55. United States v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1973). "We cannot read into the
language of the subsection a proscription of the carrying of any object which has the capacity to
be used in the furtherance of a crime aboard an aircraft." Id. (footnote listing those objects
outlined in text accompanying this note omitted.)
56. 483 F.2d 708, 719 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), vacated, 414 U.S. 1106
(1973), remanded with directions to dismiss, 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).

57. Id. at 712.
58. See notes 17-22 supra and accompanying text.
59. Because Margraf's knife was not proscribed in either the state of departure or destination,
the government could not meet its burden of proof by merely showing that the defendant carried
a specifically proscribed object, which he knew to be that object. Under Freed, Margraf must
have known that the knife he was carrying was deadly or dangerous and this element of the
offense must be proved by the prosecution. 483 F.2d at 716.
60. See note 30 infra and accompanying text.
61. 342 U.S. 246 (1952).
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require no showing of criminal intent for convictions to be sustained. 61
Because subsection () does not contain an explicit reference to intent, the
court of appeals looked to the statute's common law origins and the policy
underlying it 63 to determine whether an intent requirement might still be
inferred from the statute.
The Eighth Circuit had previously faced difficulties in construing this
subsection in United States v. Brown. 64 Defendant therein was convicted for
violating subsection () after a routine inspection of his bags revealed a loaded
tear gas pistol. 65 In reversing and remanding the case, the court of appeals
considered the harmful effects of the lower court's construction of the statute. 66 Federal law establishing criminal liability for an object readily detectable in pre-flight search which can serve as a potential weapon "carries
far-reaching consequences for the unwary and uninformed person who may
travel by air."'67 The Eighth Circuit remanded the case because the magistrate
had made no specific finding as to concealment of the tear gas pistol. The
majority used the element of concealment 68to avoid the harsh effect of the
statute as construed by the district court.
The court in Flurn concluded that the policy behind the passage of the
amendments to the Federal Aviation Act was obvious. "Nowhere in the
[House] report is found any inference of a congressional purpose or policy that
intent to conceal must be demonstrated in order to prove the fact of concealment." 69 As the House Report had indicated, the legislation was to be as broad
as possible in its coverage. 70 The majority also felt that the standard imposed
by the statute was reasonable and the stringent rule was justified in view of
the dangers to large numbers of passengers traveling by air. 7' The court
since
further concluded that a violator of the statute would not be stigmatized
72
a violation would result in only a misdemeanor conviction.
Flum had argued that since the offense had its origins in the common law
62.

United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see notes 10-18 supra and

accompanying text.

63.

See note 9 supra and accompanying text.

64.
65.
66.
67.

508
376
508
Id.

F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1974).
F. Supp. 451 (W.D. Mo.), rev'd, 508 F.2d 427 (8th Cir. 1974); see note 50 supra.
F.2d 427, 431 (8th Cir. 1974).
at 431.

68. Although the court did not specifically state that intent to conceal was an element of the
charged offense, such an interpretation can readily be inferred. "The institution of these preflight
boarding procedures, such as those carried out during the incident in question, requires a court to
consider whether a passenger who voluntarily tenders his hand luggage to a qualified inspector is
concealing any item which will be observed upon routine inspection. Ordinarily, the act of a
passenger presenting his hand luggage to responsible airline personnel for inspection suggests an
intent to disclose rather than to conceal those items within the bag which will come into view on
ordinary inspection." Id. at 432.
69.

United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 43 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc); see note 7 supra and

accompanying text.
70.
71.
72.

518 F.2d at 43.
Id.
Id.
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offense of concealment of a weapon, consequently, proof of intent to conceal
was mandatory to sustain a valid conviction. 7 3 The court dismissed this
contention because the offense was not one of merely carrying a concealed
weapon about one's person, but boarding an airplane while carrying a
concealed deadly or dangerous weapon. 74 The court was convinced that the
congressional purpose of prohibiting the carrying of weapons on aircraft was
consistent with the conclusion that the element of intent to conceal is not
75
essential to sustain a conviction based on this section.
In addition to relying on Morissette for the propriety of criminal statutes
that contain no intent requirement, the majority also looked to the Margrf
and Dishnmn decisions in concluding that section 1472(1) is a non-intent
statute.7 6 Such reliance may be misplaced. The Margraf decision, after
determining that there was no intent requirement, went on to say that "[a]
person who boards a plane with a concealed deadly weapon need not intend
to use it to be a hazard.""v In Dishman, the Ninth Circuit also concluded
that section 1472() was a non-intent statute. 7 However, when the court
discussed the material elements of the offense, 79 it stated that "[a]ny necessary
element of present or later developed intent to make use of the 'deadly and
dangerous weapon' in the commission of a crime while aboard the aircraft is
conspicuous by its utter absence." 80 The focus on intent to use the object was
one quite unrelated to the question of intent to board a plane with a concealed
weapon. Both Margraf and Dishman ultimately turned on other factors and
the issue raised in Flum was not a crucial one in either of the other cases. 8 '
Furthermore, in Flum, defendant made no contention that the knives he
was carrying were not deadly or dangerous weapons. The absence of this
issue in the Flum decision prevented clarification of the vague standard as to
what weapons are proscribed under section 1472(I). The Flum court's only
mention of the Brown decision occurred in a footnote stating that "[t]o the
extent that any dicta [in Brown] may impliedly suggest that intent is a
73. Id. at 41.
74. Id. at 44.

75. "Congress did not intend to impede the deterrent effect of its statute by imposing upon
the government prosecutor the added burden of showing the state of mind of the person found
attempting to board an aircraft with a deadly or dangerous concealed weapon." Id.
76.
77.

Id. at 44.
United States v. Margraf, 483 F.2d 708, 710 (3d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 414 U.S. 1106

(1973), remanded with directions to dismiss, 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc).
78. United States v. Dishman, 486 F.2d 727, 732 (9th Cir. 1973).
79. "The material elements of the charged offense are: 1) an attempt on the part of a person to
board an aircraft; and 2) then having on his person a concealed 'deadly and dangerous weapon.'"
Id. at 730.
80. Id.
81. Margraf was eventually remanded to the district court with directions to dismiss the
government's complaint when it was stipulated that the weapon in question was proscribed by
the statute according to the FAA guidelines promulgated subsequent to the incident. 493 F.2d
1206 (3d Cir. 1974). Dishman's conviction was reversed because the starter pistol he was carrying
at the time of his arrest was held not to be a deadly or dangerous weapon per se and hence not
within section 1472(1)'s proscription.
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necessary ingredient of the element of concealment, we decline to follow it, in

light of our en banc holding today."8 2 The majority conceded that a nonintent construction of the statute "may operate harshly upon passengers
boarding aircraft with articles which potentially are deadly or dangerous
weapons. 's3 Such language, although consoling, does not help an innocent
traveler who faces imprisonment or a fine. Innocent individuals may suffer if
section 1472() continues to be interpreted as not requiring any criminal intent.
Because Congress has drafted a statute with no guide as to what is prohibited
as a dangerous or deadly weapon, air travelers carrying such items as knitting
needles, scissors, letter openers and the like, might well be prosecuted and
face a jail sentence and/or a fine. A criminal statute creating a new offense
should "be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it what
conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties .
84...
8s
The stated purpose of this legislation is to "deter all except the hopelessly
unbalanced from risking life and liberty in such [criminal] undertakings." ' '
Stiff penalties will not deter those who act with no criminal purpose and
consequently fall outside the avowed purpose of the statute. The vague
wording of section 1472(l), coupled with the construction which the courts
have given it, can only lead to arbitrary and discriminatory law enforcement,8 6 entrusting lawmaking to the moment-to-moment judgment of security guards at our nations' airports.
Selective enforcement was the issue in a recent district court case" wherein
defendant contended that "the vast majority of persons from whom weapons
have been confiscated are not prosecuted. 88 Because the passenger arrests
included many for drug and disorderly conduct charges in addition to
weapons related charges, the court could not determine whether "any arbitrary classification or unjustifiable standard was utilized in determining
whether to prosecute." 8 9 The question is not whether persons arrested in
similar circumstances have escaped prosecution, but whether persons who are
discovered to be carrying weapons are arrested at all. Figures outlined in
Margraf and Flum demonstrate the discrepancies that presently exist. 90
82. United States v. Flum, 518 F.2d 39, 44 n.9 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
83. Id. at 45. "Balanced against the heavy risks to large numbers of passengers, including
those who would carry such weapons on board with no evil purpose, we cannot say that the

resulting effect is too severe." Id.
84.

Connally v. General Constr. Co., 269 U.S. 385, 391 (1926).

85. Administrative News, supra note 5, at 2564.
86. Statutes with defects similar to section 1472(1) have been declared unconstitutional on
numerous occasions. E.g., Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566, 572-73 (1974); Grayned v. City of
Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108-09 (1972).
87. United States v. Wilkinson, 389 F. Supp. 465 (W.D. Pa. 1975).
88. Id. at 468.
89. Id. "The statistics to which defendant refers simply do not show that persons arrested in
similar circumstances have escaped prosecution and that the government in this case employed an
arbitrary and selective motive in prosecuting the defendant." Id. at 469.
90. In December, 1972, for 1,536 weapons seized, only thirty-seven arrests were made. In
January, 1973, for 645 weapons seized, only fifty-seven arrests were made. United States v.
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Rather than the courts erring in a judicial construction, it appears that
Congress has enacted a statute which is not constitutionally enforceable. 9 1
Perhaps the soundest approach to be followed by the courts until such time as
a workable statute is drafted would be to require the surrender of those
articles which are potentially dangerous, without criminal liability and with
proper provisions for return. 92 Further convictions under section 1472(l)
would be repugnant to the long standing precepts of due process of law.

Robert P. Giesen
Margraf, 483 F.2d 708, 722 (3d Cir.) (en banc) (Seitz, C.J., dissenting), vacated, 414 U.S. 1106

(1973), remanded with directions to dismiss, 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974) (en banc). In 1974,
67,710 weapons were detected but only 1,147 arrests were made. United States v. Flum, S18
F.2d 39, 48 (8th Cir. 1975) (en banc).
91. United States v. Margraf, 483 F.2d 708 (3d Cir.) (en banc), vacated, 414 U.S. 1106
(1973), remanded with directions to dismiss, 493 F.2d 1206 (3d Cir. 1974). "Because most
anything could become a deadly or dangerous weapon if so wielded, and because Congress has
given no standards by which such determinations are to be made in the absence of any manifested
use, a reasonable man reading this statute would not be adequately forewarned of what is
considered criminal conduct under its provisions. Id. at 721 (Seitz, C.J., dissenting).
92. Id. at 722-23.

